Phpmyfaq CVEs & Vulnerabilities

phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application. Prior to version 4.1.1, the regex-based SVG sanitizer in phpMyFAQ (SvgSanitizer.php) can be bypassed using HTML entity encoding in javascript: URLs within SVG <a href> attributes. Any user with edit_faq permission can upload a malicious SVG that executes arbitrary JavaScript when viewed, enabling privilege escalation from editor to full admin takeover. This issue has been patched in version 4.1.1.

phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application. Prior to version 4.1.1, the searchCustomPages() method in phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Search.php uses real_escape_string() (via escape()) to sanitize the search term before embedding it in LIKE clauses. However, real_escape_string() does not escape SQL LIKE metacharacters % (match any sequence) and _ (match any single character). An unauthenticated attacker can inject these wildcards into search queries, causing them to match unintended records — including content that was not meant to be surfaced — resulting in information disclosure. This issue has been patched in version 4.1.1.

phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application. Prior to version 4.1.1, there is a stored XSS vulnerability via Regex Bypass in Filter::removeAttributes(). This issue has been patched in version 4.1.1.

phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application. Prior to version 4.1.1, the MediaBrowserController::index() method handles file deletion for the media browser. When the fileRemove action is triggered, the user-supplied name parameter is concatenated with the base upload directory path without any path traversal validation. The FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS filter only encodes HTML special characters (&, ', ", <, >) and characters with ASCII value < 32, and does not prevent directory traversal sequences like ../. Additionally, the endpoint does not validate CSRF tokens, making it exploitable via CSRF attacks. This issue has been patched in version 4.1.1.

phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application. Prior to version 4.1.1, an unauthenticated attacker can submit a guest FAQ with an email address that is syntactically valid per RFC 5321 (quoted local part) yet contains raw HTML — for example "<script>alert(1)</script>"@evil.com. PHP's FILTER_VALIDATE_EMAIL accepts this email as valid. The email is stored in the database without HTML sanitization and later rendered in the admin FAQ editor template using Twig's |raw filter, which bypasses auto-escaping entirely. This issue has been patched in version 4.1.1.

phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application. Prior to version 4.0.18, the WebAuthn prepare endpoint (`/api/webauthn/prepare`) creates new active user accounts without any authentication, CSRF protection, captcha, or configuration checks. This allows unauthenticated attackers to create unlimited user accounts even when registration is disabled. Version 4.0.18 fixes the issue.