OvarroCVEs & Vulnerabilities
12 CVEs affecting Ovarro products, tracked from the National Vulnerability Database, with CVSS/EPSS scores and exploitation status.
Most Affected Products
All versions of the TWinSoft Configuration Tool store encrypted passwords as plaintext in memory. An attacker with access to system files could open a file to load the document into memory, including sensitive information associated with document, such as password. The attacker could then obtain the plaintext password by using a memory viewer.
The affected TBox RTUs allow low privilege users to access software security tokens of higher privilege. This could allow an attacker with “user” privileges to access files requiring higher privileges by establishing an SSH session and providing the other tokens.
The affected TBox RTUs generate software security tokens using insufficient entropy. The random seed used to generate the software tokens is not initialized correctly, and other parts of the token are generated using predictable time-based values. An attacker with this knowledge could successfully brute force the token and authenticate themselves.
The affected TBox RTUs run OpenVPN with root privileges and can run user defined configuration scripts. An attacker could set up a local OpenVPN server and push a malicious script onto the TBox host to acquire root privileges.
The affected TBox RTUs store hashed passwords using MD5 encryption, which is an insecure encryption algorithm.
The affected TBox RTUs are missing authorization for running some API commands. An attacker running these commands could reveal sensitive information such as software versions and web server file contents.
An attacker may use TWinSoft and a malicious source project file (TPG) to extract files on machine executing Ovarro TWinSoft, which could lead to code execution.
Ovarro TBox proprietary Modbus file access functions allow attackers to read, alter, or delete the configuration file.
The “ipk” package containing the configuration created by TWinSoft can be uploaded, extracted, and executed in Ovarro TBox, allowing malicious code execution.
Ovarro TBox TWinSoft uses the custom hardcoded user “TWinSoft” with a hardcoded key.
An attacker could use specially crafted invalid Modbus frames to crash the Ovarro TBox system.
An attacker can decrypt the Ovarro TBox login password by communication capture and brute force attacks.