CVE-2026-46149

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

scsi: target: configfs: Bound snprintf() return in tg_pt_gp_members_show()

target_tg_pt_gp_members_show() formats LUN paths with snprintf() into a

256-byte stack buffer, then will memcpy() cur_len bytes from that

buffer. snprintf() returns the length the output would have had, which

can exceed the buffer size when the fabric WWN is long because iSCSI IQN

names can be up to 223 bytes. The check at the memcpy() site only

guards the destination page write, not the source read, so memcpy() will

read past the stack buffer and copy adjacent stack contents to the sysfs

reader, which when CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE is enabled, fortify_panic()

will be triggered.

Commit 27e06650a5ea ("scsi: target: target_core_configfs: Add length

check to avoid buffer overflow") added the same bound to the

target_lu_gp_members_show() but the tg_pt_gp variant was missed so

resolve that here.