CVE-2026-43038

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ipv6: icmp: clear skb2->cb[] in ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach()

Sashiko AI-review observed:

In ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach(), the skb is an outer IPv4 ICMP error packet

where its cb contains an IPv4 inet_skb_parm. When skb is cloned into skb2

and passed to icmp6_send(), it uses IP6CB(skb2).

IP6CB interprets the IPv4 inet_skb_parm as an inet6_skb_parm. The cipso

offset in inet_skb_parm.opt directly overlaps with dsthao in inet6_skb_parm

at offset 18.

If an attacker sends a forged ICMPv4 error with a CIPSO IP option, dsthao

would be a non-zero offset. Inside icmp6_send(), mip6_addr_swap() is called

and uses ipv6_find_tlv(skb, opt->dsthao, IPV6_TLV_HAO).

This would scan the inner, attacker-controlled IPv6 packet starting at that

offset, potentially returning a fake TLV without checking if the remaining

packet length can hold the full 18-byte struct ipv6_destopt_hao.

Could mip6_addr_swap() then perform a 16-byte swap that extends past the end

of the packet data into skb_shared_info?

Should the cb array also be cleared in ip6_err_gen_icmpv6_unreach() and

ip6ip6_err() to prevent this?

This patch implements the first suggestion.

I am not sure if ip6ip6_err() needs to be changed.

A separate patch would be better anyway.