CVE-2026-31448

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ext4: avoid infinite loops caused by residual data

On the mkdir/mknod path, when mapping logical blocks to physical blocks,

if inserting a new extent into the extent tree fails (in this example,

because the file system disabled the huge file feature when marking the

inode as dirty), ext4_ext_map_blocks() only calls ext4_free_blocks() to

reclaim the physical block without deleting the corresponding data in

the extent tree. This causes subsequent mkdir operations to reference

the previously reclaimed physical block number again, even though this

physical block is already being used by the xattr block. Therefore, a

situation arises where both the directory and xattr are using the same

buffer head block in memory simultaneously.

The above causes ext4_xattr_block_set() to enter an infinite loop about

"inserted" and cannot release the inode lock, ultimately leading to the

143s blocking problem mentioned in [1].

If the metadata is corrupted, then trying to remove some extent space

can do even more harm. Also in case EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_DELALLOC_RESERVE

was passed, remove space wrongly update quota information.

Jan Kara suggests distinguishing between two cases:

1) The error is ENOSPC or EDQUOT - in this case the filesystem is fully

consistent and we must maintain its consistency including all the

accounting. However these errors can happen only early before we've

inserted the extent into the extent tree. So current code works correctly

for this case.

2) Some other error - this means metadata is corrupted. We should strive to

do as few modifications as possible to limit damage. So I'd just skip

freeing of allocated blocks.

[1]

INFO: task syz.0.17:5995 blocked for more than 143 seconds.

Call Trace:

inode_lock_nested include/linux/fs.h:1073 [inline]

__start_dirop fs/namei.c:2923 [inline]

start_dirop fs/namei.c:2934 [inline]