Threat Intelligence Directory

financially motivated threat actor operating from China

UNC6671 is involved in credential harvesting operations, utilizing vishing tactics to impersonate IT staff and directing victims to enter credentials on a victim-branded site. They have gained access to Okta customer accounts and employed PowerShell to download sensitive data from SharePoint and OneDrive. Their extortion tactics include aggressive harassment of victim personnel, and they have used unbranded extortion emails with different Tox IDs for communication. The threat actors have shown a preference for registering domains with Tucows, indicating potential operational differences from related threat groups.

TGR-STA-1030 is a state-aligned cyberespionage group operating out of Asia, known for compromising government and critical infrastructure organizations across 37 countries. The group frequently deploys web shells, such as Behinder, Neo-reGeorg, and Godzilla, on both external and internal web servers to maintain access and enable lateral movement. TGR-STA-1030 has conducted extensive reconnaissance against government infrastructure, particularly focusing on nations in the South China Sea and Gulf of Thailand regions, as well as European countries like Germany. The group primarily targets government ministries and departments for espionage purposes, especially those exploring specific economic partnerships.

UNC6485 is a cyber-espionage group exploiting CVE-2025-12480 in Gladinet’s Triofox file-sharing platform to gain initial network access and establish long-term persistence. They create unauthorized administrative accounts and deploy RATs, utilizing legitimate tools like Zoho Assist and AnyDesk to evade detection. Their TTPs indicate a sophisticated understanding of the platform, allowing them to blend malicious activities with legitimate administrative actions.

The actor systematically exported large volumes of data from numerous corporate Salesforce instances. GTIG assesses the primary intent of the threat actor is to harvest credentials. After the data was exfiltrated, the actor searched through the data to look for secrets that could be potentially used to compromise victim environments. GTIG observed UNC6395 targeting sensitive credentials such as Amazon Web Services (AWS) access keys (AKIA), passwords, and Snowflake-related access tokens. UNC6395 demonstrated operational security awareness by deleting query jobs, however logs were not impacted and organizations should still review relevant logs for evidence of data exposure.

UNC6384 is a Chinese-affiliated APT that conducts targeted espionage campaigns primarily against diplomatic entities in Southeast Asia and Europe, specifically Belgium and Hungary. The group exploits the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut vulnerability to gain initial code execution via malicious .LNK files, deploying the PlugX RAT through sophisticated delivery mechanisms, including DLL side-loading and adversary-in-the-middle attacks. Their operations involve social engineering tactics, such as spear-phishing emails themed around diplomatic events, to entice victims into executing malicious payloads. UNC6384's use of valid code signing and HTTPS hosting enhances their evasion of detection and increases the likelihood of user interaction.

suspected Russian espionage group.

UNC6293 is a Russian state-sponsored threat actor identified by Google's Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG), which associates them with APT29 with low confidence. They have conducted campaigns utilizing social engineering tactics, including leveraging App-Specific Passwords for account compromises. GTIG has also noted a second campaign by UNC6293 that incorporates Ukrainian themes.

UNC6201 is a sophisticated Chinese state-sponsored hacking group that exploited CVE-2026–22769, a critical vulnerability in Dell RecoverPoint for Virtual Machines appliances, to establish a persistent presence. They deployed a permanent backdoor using techniques like Single Packet Authorization and "Port Knocking." Unlike typical hackers who conceal their activities within the Operating System, UNC6201 operated at the Virtualization Layer to avoid detection.

UNC6148 is a financially motivated threat actor that targets SonicWall Secure Mobile Access 100 series appliances, leveraging stolen credentials and possibly zero-day exploits to deploy a persistent backdoor known as OVERSTEP. They utilize a kernel-level rootkit for stealthy access and have been observed establishing SSL VPN sessions to launch reverse shells and manipulate system files. The actor's operations include credential theft, data exfiltration, and potential ransomware deployment, with evidence suggesting they modify legitimate scripts to maintain persistence. Their activities are characterized by the reuse of OTP seeds and admin credentials, allowing continued access even after security patches are applied.

UNC6040 is a financially motivated threat cluster that employs vishing to gain access to organizations' Salesforce environments, facilitating large-scale data exfiltration. The group manipulates end users into authorizing malicious connected apps, often masquerading as IT support personnel, to exploit OAuth permissions. Following initial access, UNC6040 leverages harvested credentials to move laterally within victim networks, targeting other cloud platforms like Okta and Microsoft 365. Their operations are characterized by the use of Mullvad VPN IP addresses and a focus on social engineering tactics to bypass security measures.

UNC6032 is a threat actor that weaponizes interest in AI tools, specifically targeting users with fake "AI video generator" websites to distribute malware, including Python-based infostealers and backdoors. Victims are typically directed to these sites through malicious social media ads that impersonate legitimate tools. Compromises have led to the exfiltration of sensitive data, including login credentials and credit card information, via the Telegram API. Google Threat Intelligence Group assesses UNC6032 to have a Vietnam nexus.

UNC5820 is a threat actor exploiting the CVE-2024-47575 vulnerability in Fortinet's FortiManager, allowing them to bypass authentication and execute arbitrary commands. They have been observed exfiltrating configuration data, user information, and FortiOS256-hashed passwords from managed FortiGate devices. While the actor has staged and exfiltrated sensitive data, there is currently no evidence of lateral movement or further compromise of additional environments. Mandiant has not determined whether UNC5820 is state-sponsored or identified its geographic location.

UNC5537 is a financially motivated threat actor targeting Snowflake customer databases. They use stolen credentials obtained from infostealer malware to access and exfiltrate large volumes of data. The compromised accounts lack multi-factor authentication, allowing UNC5537 to conduct data theft and extortion.

UNC5342 is a North Korea-linked APT that employs the EtherHiding technique to deliver malware and facilitate cryptocurrency theft. The actor has been observed deploying EtherRAT and JADESNOW malware, utilizing transaction history as a Dead Drop Resolver to embed payloads directly into the calldata of blockchain transactions. Their operations involve leveraging centralized API services to interact with public blockchains like Ethereum and BNB Smart Chain. The malware is designed to exfiltrate sensitive data, particularly targeting cryptocurrency wallets and credentials.

UNC5337 is a suspected China-nexus espionage actor that compromised Ivanti Connect Secure VPN appliances as early as Jan. 2024. UNC5337 is suspected to exploit CVE-2023-46805 (authentication bypass) and CVE-2024-21887 (command injection) for infecting Ivanti Connect Secure appliances. UNC5337 leveraged multiple custom malware families including the SPAWNSNAIL passive backdoor, SPAWNMOLE tunneler, SPAWNANT installer, and SPAWNSLOTH log tampering utility. Mandiant suspects with medium confidence that UNC5337 is UNC5221.

UNC5330 is a suspected China-nexus espionage actor. UNC5330 has been observed chaining CVE-2024-21893 and CVE-2024-21887 to compromise Ivanti Connect Secure VPN appliances as early as Feb. 2024. Post-compromise activity by UNC5330 includes deployment of PHANTOMNET and TONERJAM. UNC5330 has employed Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to perform reconnaissance, move laterally, manipulate registry entries, and establish persistence. Mandiant observed UNC5330 operating a server since Dec. 6, 2021, which the group used as a GOST proxy to help facilitate malicious tool deployment to endpoints. The default certificate for GOST proxy was observed from Sept. 1, 2022 through Jan. 1, 2024. UNC5330 also attempted to download Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP) from this server on Feb. 3, 2024, from a compromised Ivanti Connect Secure device. Given the SSH key reuse in conjunction with the temporal proximity of these events, Mandiant assesses with moderate confidence UNC5330 has been operating through this server since at least 2021.

UNC5325 is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage operator that exploited CVE-2024-21893 to compromise Ivanti Connect Secure appliances. UNC5325 leveraged code from open-source projects, installed custom malware, and modified the appliance's settings in order to evade detection and attempt to maintain persistence. UNC5325 has been observed deploying LITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA, PITSTOP, PITDOG, PITJET, and PITHOOK. Mandiant identified TTPs and malware code overlaps in LITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA and PITHOOK with malware leveraged by UNC3886. Mandiant assesses with moderate confidence that UNC5325 is associated with UNC3886.

UNC5291 is a cluster of targeted probing activity that we assess with moderate confidence is associated with UNC3236, also known publicly as Volt Typhoon. Activity for this cluster started in December 2023 focusing on Citrix Netscaler ADC and then shifted to focus on Ivanti Connect Secure devices after details were made public in mid-Jan. 2024. Probing has been observed against the academic, energy, defense, and health sectors, which aligns with past Volt Typhoon interest in critical infrastructure. In Feb. 2024, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released an advisory warning that Volt Typhoon was targeting critical infrastructure and was potentially interested in Ivanti Connect Secure devices for initial access.

Mandiant created UNC5266 to track post-disclosure exploitation leading to deployment of Bishop Fox's SLIVER implant framework, a WARPWIRE variant, and a new malware family that Mandiant has named TERRIBLETEA. At this time, based on observed infrastructure usage similarities, Mandiant suspects with moderate confidence that UNC5266 overlaps in part with UNC3569, a China-nexus espionage actor that has been observed exploiting vulnerabilities in Aspera Faspex, Microsoft Exchange, and Oracle Web Applications Desktop Integrator, among others, to gain initial access to target environments.

UNC5174, a Chinese state-sponsored threat actor, has been identified by Mandiant for exploiting critical vulnerabilities in F5 BIG-IP and ScreenConnect. They have been linked to targeting research and education institutions, businesses, charities, NGOs, and government organizations in Southeast Asia, the U.S., and the UK. UNC5174 is believed to have connections to China's Ministry of State Security and has been observed using custom tooling and the SUPERSHELL framework in their operations. The actor has shown indications of transitioning from hacktivist collectives to working as a contractor for Chinese intelligence agencies.

UNC4990 is a financially motivated threat actor that has been active since at least 2020. They primarily target users in Italy and rely on USB devices for initial infection. The group has evolved their tactics over time, using encoded text files on popular websites like GitHub and Vimeo to host payloads. They have been observed using sophisticated backdoors like QUIETBOARD and EMPTYSPACE, and have targeted organizations in various industries, particularly in Italy.

UNC4841 is a well-resourced threat actor that has utilized a wide range of malware and purpose-built tooling to enable their global espionage operations. They have been observed selectively deploying specific malware families at high priority targets, with SKIPJACK being the most widely deployed. UNC4841 primarily targeted government and technology organizations, but they have also been observed targeting other verticals.

UNC4736 is a North Korean threat actor that has been involved in supply chain attacks targeting software chains of 3CX and X_TRADER. They have used malware strains such as TAXHAUL, Coldcat, and VEILEDSIGNAL to compromise Windows and macOS systems. UNC4736 has been linked to financially motivated cybercrime operations, particularly focused on cryptocurrency and fintech-related services. They have also demonstrated infrastructure overlap with other North Korean and APT43 activity.

UNC4540 is a suspected Chinese threat actor targeting unpatched SonicWall Secure Mobile Access appliances to deploy custom malware that establishes long-term persistence for cyber espionage. The malware is designed to steal hashed credentials, provide shell access, and persist through firmware upgrades, utilizing a variant of the TinyShell backdoor. Mandiant has tracked UNC4540's activities back to 2021, noting their focus on maintaining access to compromised devices. The group's tactics are consistent with patterns observed in other Chinese threat actor campaigns targeting network devices for zero-day exploits.

UNC4536 is a threat actor that distributes malware, including ICEDID, REDLINESTEALER, and CARBANAK, primarily through malvertising and trojanized MSIX installers masquerading as popular software. They utilize SEO poisoning tactics to direct victims to malicious sites that mimic legitimate software hosting platforms, facilitating the download of compromised installers. The actor employs a PowerShell script known as NUMOZYLOD to deliver tailored payloads, such as the CARBANAK backdoor, to their partners. Additionally, UNC4536 has been linked to campaigns that distribute NetSupport RAT, targeting IT administrators through fake sites promoted via Google Ads.

UNC4487 is a threat actor that targeted Ukrainian government officials by compromising a Ukrainian auto insurance website essential for official travel. This attack facilitated the distribution of the MATANBUCHUS malware, which was used to monetize access to infected systems. Mandiant later identified additional malware samples, referred to as ChillyHell, linked to UNC4487 through the reuse of a code signing certificate associated with MATANBUCHUS. The group's activities highlight a focus on exploiting critical infrastructure for financial gain.

UNC4393 is a financially motivated threat actor primarily using BASTA ransomware. They have been active since early 2022 and have targeted over 40 organizations across various industries. UNC4393 has shown a willingness to cooperate with other threat clusters for initial access and has evolved from using existing tools to developing custom malware. They focus on efficient data exfiltration and multi-faceted extortion, often utilizing tools like COGSCAN and RCLONE for reconnaissance and data theft.

UNC4191 is a China-linked threat actor that has been involved in cyber espionage campaigns targeting public and private sectors primarily in Southeast Asia. They have been known to use USB devices as an initial infection vector and have been observed deploying various malware families on infected systems. UNC4191's operations have also extended to the US, Europe, and the Asia Pacific Japan region, with a particular focus on the Philippines.

UNC3973 is a financially motivated threat actor tracked by Mandiant, distinguished from the broader BASTA ransomware ecosystem (primarily tracked as UNC4393) due to its unique operational characteristics and TTPs. This actor has demonstrated a specific focus on supply chain compromises, as evidenced by their June campaign targeting credit unions in western Canada via a compromised managed service provider (MSP). UNC3973 leverages unauthorized service accounts with elevated privileges, specifically domain administrator accounts shared between the compromised MSP and the target organizations, to gain initial access.This actor's post-exploitation activity includes attempts to disable security controls and deploy the SYSTEMBC tunneler for command and control (C2) communication, followed by attempts to deploy BASTA ransomware. While their attempts to deploy both SYSTEMBC and BASTA have been observed, these were thankfully thwarted by endpoint security solutions in observed instances. The targeted, supply chain-enabled nature of UNC3973's intrusions, coupled with its use of privileged shared accounts and attempts at deploying BASTA, all suggest that it is an exclusive group, perhaps even affiliates working closely with or possibly operating under the direct control, BASTA ransomware operators. This group's ability to exploit centralized access points, like MSPs, represents a significant threat to organizations reliant on third-party providers.

A suspected Iranian threat activity cluster has been linked to attacks aimed at Israeli shipping, government, energy, and healthcare organizations, in a campaign stretching back to late 2020. Researchers believe that the data harvested during the campaign could be used to support various activities. UNC3890, the threat actor behind the attacks, deployed two proprietary pieces of malware – a backdoor named “SUGARUSH” and a browser credential stealer called “SUGARDUMP”, which exfiltrates password information to email addresses registered with Gmail, ProtonMail, Yahoo and Yandex email services. The threat actor also employs a network of C&C servers that host fake login pages impersonating legitimate platforms such as Office 365, LinkedIn and Facebook. These servers are designed to communicate with the targets and also with a watering hole hosted on the login page of a legitimate Israeli shipping company.

[UNC3886](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1048) is a China-nexus cyberespionage group that has been active since at least 2022, targeting defense, technology, and telecommunication organizations located in the United States and the Asia-Pacific-Japan (APJ) regions. [UNC3886](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1048) has displayed a deep understanding of edge devices and virtualization technologies through the exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities and the use of novel malware families and utilities.(Citation: Mandiant Fortinet Zero Day)(Citation: Google Cloud Threat Intelligence VMWare ESXi Zero-Day 2023)

China-nexus espionage actor that has been observed exploiting vulnerabilities in Aspera Faspex, Microsoft Exchange, and Oracle Web Applications Desktop Integrator, among others, to gain initial access to target environments.

Mandiant observed this group operating since December 2019. Its techniques partially overlap with multiple Russian-based espionage actors (APT28 and APT29). They are described as having a high level of operational security, low malware footprint, adept evasive skills, and a large Internet of Things (IoT) device botnet at their disposal.

UNC2970 is a North Korean threat actor that primarily targets organizations through spear-phishing emails with job recruitment themes, often utilizing fake LinkedIn accounts to engage victims. The group employs the PLANKWALK backdoor and other malware families, leveraging compromised WordPress sites for command and control. They have been observed using BYOVD techniques to exploit vulnerable drivers for evading detection. Mandiant has noted a shift in UNC2970's targeting strategy, including a focus on security researchers and advancements in their operational capabilities against EDR tools.

UNC2814 is a suspected PRC-nexus cyber espionage group that has targeted telecommunications providers and government entities globally since at least 2017. The group employs the GRIDTIDE backdoor to blend malicious traffic with legitimate cloud API activity and utilizes living-off-the-land techniques, including SSH lateral movement and the creation of malicious systemd services. GTIG has confirmed 53 intrusions across 42 countries and identified suspected activity in at least 20 additional nations, with a focus on exfiltrating sensitive communications data. Google has taken significant disruption actions against UNC2814, including infrastructure takedowns and the release of IOCs to aid in detection.

UNC2717 is a threat actor that engages in espionage activities aligned with Chinese government priorities. They demonstrate advanced tradecraft and take measures to avoid detection, making it challenging for network defenders to identify their tools and intrusion methods. UNC2717, along with other Chinese APT actors, has been observed stealing credentials, email communications, and intellectual property. They have targeted global government agencies using malware such as HARDPULSE, QUIETPULSE, and PULSEJUMP.

UNC2659 has been active since at least January 2021. We have observed the threat actor move through the whole attack lifecycle in under 10 days. UNC2659 is notable given their use of an exploit in the SonicWall SMA100 SSL VPN product, which has since been patched by SonicWall. The threat actor appeared to download several tools used for various phases of the attack lifecycle directly from those tools’ legitimate public websites.

UNC2630 is a threat actor believed to be affiliated with the Chinese government. They engage in cyber espionage activities, targeting organizations aligned with Beijing's strategic objectives. UNC2630 demonstrates advanced tradecraft and employs various malware families, including SLOWPULSE and RADIALPULSE, to compromise Pulse Secure VPN appliances. They also utilize modified binaries and scripts to maintain persistence and move laterally within compromised networks.

UNC2565 is a threat group that has used the GOOTLOADER downloader to deliver Cobalt Strike BEACON. These intrusions have stemmed from victims accessing malicious websites that use SEO techniques to improve Google search rankings. After obtaining a foothold in the environment, UNC2565 has conducted reconnaissance and credential harvesting activity using common tools such as BLOODHOUND and KERBEROAST. UNC2565's motivations are currently unknown but overlaps with activity that has led to SODINOKIBI ransomware. This suggests that the threat group may be financially motivated.