Threat Intelligence Directory

[Volatile Cedar](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0123) is a Lebanese threat group that has targeted individuals, companies, and institutions worldwide. [Volatile Cedar](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0123) has been operating since 2012 and is motivated by political and ideological interests.(Citation: CheckPoint Volatile Cedar March 2015)(Citation: ClearSky Lebanese Cedar Jan 2021)

Void Rabisu is an intrusion set associated with both financially motivated ransomware attacks and targeted campaigns on Ukraine and countries supporting Ukraine.

Void Manticore is an Iranian APT group affiliated with MOIS, known for conducting destructive wiping attacks and influence operations. They collaborate with Scarred Manticore, sharing targets and conducting disruptive operations using custom wipers. Void Manticore's TTPs involve manual file deletion, lateral movement via RDP, and the deployment of custom wipers like the BiBi wiper. The group utilizes online personas like 'Karma' and 'Homeland Justice' to leak information and amplify the impact of their attacks.

Void Blizzard’s cyberespionage operations tend to be highly targeted at specific organizations of interest to the Russian government, including in government, defense, transportation, media, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and healthcare sectors primarily in Europe and North America. The threat actor uses stolen credentials—which are likely procured from commodity infostealer ecosystems—and collects a high volume of email and files from compromised organizations.

Void Banshee is an APT group targeting North America, Europe, and Southeast Asia for information theft and financial gain. They exploit vulnerabilities like CVE-2024-38112 to deliver the Atlantida info-stealer through malicious PDFs disguised as book files. The group uses internet shortcuts with MHTML protocol handlers to access and execute files through disabled Internet Explorer, posing a significant threat to organizations. Void Banshee's TTPs include crafting URL strings to control window sizes in IE and using HTML files to hide malicious downloads from victims.

Void Balaur is a highly active hack-for-hire / cyber mercenary group with a wide range of known target types across the globe. Their services have been observed for sale to the public online since at least 2016. Services include the collection of private data and access to specific online email and social media services, such as Gmail, Outlook, Telegram, Yandex, Facebook, Instagram, and business emails.

Void Arachne is a threat actor group targeting Chinese-speaking users with malicious MSI files containing legitimate software installers for AI software. They exploit public interest in VPN technology and AI software to distribute malware through SEO poisoning and Chinese-language-themed Telegram channels. The group's campaign includes bundling malicious Winos payloads with deepfake pornography-generating AI software and voice-and-face-swapping AI software. Void Arachne also promotes AI technologies for virtual kidnapping and uses AI voice-alternating technology to pressure victims into paying ransom.

VIKING SPIDER is the criminal group behind the development and distribution of Ragnar Locker ransomware. While public reporting indicates the group began threatening to leak victim data in February 2020, a DLS was not observed until April 2020. The DLS is hosted on Tor, and similar to other actors, proof of data exfiltration is provided before the stolen data is fully leaked. It was also noted that On Dec. 22, 2020, a new post made to MountLocker ransomware’s Tor-hosted DLS was titled 'Cartel News' and included details of a victim of VIKING SPIDER’s Ragnar Locker

Threat actor tracked by Malpedia.

Check Point Research discovered a new campaign against the Mongolian public sector, which takes advantage of the current Coronavirus scare, in order to deliver a previously unknown malware implant to the target. A closer look at this campaign allowed us to tie it to other operations which were carried out by the same anonymous group, dating back to at least 2016. Over the years, these operations targeted different sectors in multiple countries, such as Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus.

ViciousTrap has compromised over 5,500 edge devices, transforming them into honeypots and utilizing a shell script called NetGhost to redirect incoming traffic from specific ports to their infrastructure. The actor has targeted various EOL devices, including ASUS routers, Linksys LRT224, and Araknis Networks AN-300-RT-4L2W VPN routers. Observations indicate attempts to deploy a web shell for executing their redirection script, although authorship of the web shell has not been attributed to ViciousTrap. The overall objectives of ViciousTrap remain unclear, but their activities suggest a honeypot-style network aimed at intercepting network flows.

Vice Spider is a Russian-speaking ransomware group that has been active since at least April 2021 and is linked to a significant increase in identity-based attacks, with a reported 583% rise in Kerberoasting incidents. CrowdStrike attributes 27% of these intrusions specifically to Vice Spider, which exploits vulnerabilities in the Kerberos authentication protocol to crack user passwords.

VICEROY TIGER is an adversary with a nexus to India that has historically targeted entities throughout multiple sectors. Older activity targeted multiple sectors and countries; however, since 2015 this adversary appears to focus on entities in Pakistan with a particular focus on government and security organizations. This adversary consistently leverages spear phishing emails containing malicious Microsoft Office documents, malware designed to target the Android mobile platform, and phishing activity designed to harvest user credentials. In March 2017, the 360 Chasing Team found a sample of targeted attacks that confirmed the previously unknown sample of APT's attack actions, which the organization can now trace back at least in April 2016. The chasing team named the attack organization APT-C-35. In June 2017, the 360 Threat Intelligence Center discovered the organization’s new attack activity, confirmed and exposed the gang’s targeted attacks against Pakistan, and analyzed in detail. The unique EHDevel malicious code framework used by the organization.

In May 2018, we discovered a campaign targeting dozens of mobile Android devices belonging to Israeli citizens. Kaspersky spyware sensors caught the signal of an attack from the device of one of the victims; and a hash of the APK involved (Android application) was tagged in our sample feed for inspection. Once we looked into the file, we quickly found out that the inner-workings of the APK included a malicious payload, embedded in the original code of the application. This was an original spyware program, designed to exfiltrate almost all accessible information. During the course of our research, we noticed that we were not the only ones to have found the operation. Researchers from Bitdefender also released an analysis of one of the samples in a blogpost. Although something had already been published, we decided to do something different with the data we acquired. The following month, we released a private report on our Threat Intelligence Portal to alert our clients about this newly discovered operation and began writing YARA rules in order to catch more samples. We decided to call the operation “ViceLeaker”, because of strings and variables in its code.

VENOM SPIDER is the developer of a large toolset that includes SKID, VenomKit and Taurus Loader. Under the moniker 'badbullzvenom', the adversary has been an active member of Russian underground forums since at least 2012, specializing in the identification of vulnerabilities and the subsequent development of tools for exploitation, as well as for gaining and maintaining access to victim machines and carding services. Recent advertisements for the malware indicate that VENOM SPIDER limits the sale and use of its tools, selling modules only to trusted affiliates. This preference can be seen in the fact that adversaries observed using the tools include the targeted criminal adversary COBALT SPIDER and BGH adversaries WIZARD SPIDER and PINCHY SPIDER.

Velvet Tempest is a threat actor associated with the BlackCat ransomware group. They have been observed deploying multiple ransomware payloads, including BlackCat, and have targeted various industries such as energy, fashion, tobacco, IT, and manufacturing. Velvet Tempest relies on access brokers to gain network access and utilizes tools like Cobalt Strike Beacons and PsExec for lateral movement and payload staging. They exfiltrate stolen data using a tool called StealBit and frequently disable unprotected antivirus products.

Vice Society is a ransomware group that has been active since at least June 2021. They primarily target the education and healthcare sectors, but have also been observed targeting the manufacturing industry. The group has used multiple ransomware families and has been known to utilize PowerShell scripts for their attacks. There are similarities between Vice Society and the Rhysida ransomware group, suggesting a potential connection or rebranding.

UTG-Q-010 is a financially motivated APT group from East Asia that has been active since late 2022, primarily targeting the pharmaceutical industry and cryptocurrency enthusiasts. They exploit legitimate Windows processes, such as "WerFault.exe," to sideload malicious DLLs like "faultrep.dll" and employ sophisticated phishing campaigns to deliver malware disguised as enticing content. Their recent campaigns have involved the use of the Pupy RAT and advanced defense evasion techniques, including in-memory execution and reflective DLL loading. UTG-Q-010's strategic focus on HR departments and the cryptocurrency sector highlights their understanding of target vulnerabilities and their ability to evade detection.

UTG-Q-008 is a threat actor targeting Linux platforms, primarily focusing on government and enterprise entities in China. They utilize a massive botnet network for espionage activities, including reconnaissance, brute-forcing, and Trojan component delivery. The actor has a history of compromising thousands of servers in China using a password dictionary based on Chinese Pinyin. UTG-Q-008 operates during standard working hours in the UTC+8 time zone, with potential ties to Eastern Europe.

UTA0388 is a China-aligned APT known for spear-phishing campaigns targeting organizations in North America, Asia, and Europe, primarily to deliver a Go-based implant called GOVERSHELL. The group employs "rapport-building phishing" tactics, engaging targets in benign conversations before sending malicious links, and has been linked to the use of Large Language Models for crafting phishing emails in multiple languages. Technical analysis indicates that UTA0388 operates in the interests of the Chinese state, with a focus on Asian geopolitical issues, as evidenced by the use of Simplified Chinese in its development environment. Volexity assesses that UTA0388's operations reflect a sophisticated blend of traditional phishing techniques and modern automation.

UTA0355 is a Russian threat actor that conducts phishing campaigns targeting individuals and organizations associated with Ukraine. The actor initiates contact via email, inviting targets to a video conference, and follows up through Signal or WhatsApp to enhance legitimacy. After establishing communication, UTA0355 prompts victims to log in via a malicious M365 URL, subsequently requesting approval for a 2FA authentication to access email data. Volexity assesses with high confidence that UTA0355 successfully registered devices and downloaded email data from compromised accounts.

UTA0352 is a Russian threat actor attributed to phishing campaigns that exploit Microsoft OAuth 2.0 authentication workflows, often impersonating government officials to lure targets into providing sensitive information. The actor has been observed using malicious URLs disguised as legitimate services, such as a Romanian government authentication system. UTA0352 has also targeted Microsoft Teams and employed social engineering tactics via messaging platforms like Signal and WhatsApp. Volexity assesses with medium confidence that UTA0352 is involved in operations themed around Ukraine, targeting individuals and organizations historically associated with Russian threat activities.

UTA0218 is a threat actor with advanced capabilities, targeting organizations to establish a reverse shell, acquire tools, and extract data. They exploit vulnerabilities in firewall devices to move laterally within victim networks, focusing on obtaining domain backup keys and active directory credentials. The actor deploys a custom Python backdoor named UPSTYLE to execute commands and download additional tools. UTA0218 is likely state-backed, utilizing a mix of infrastructure including VPNs and compromised routers to store malicious files.

While Volexity largely observed the attacker essentially living off the land, they still deployed a handful of malware files and tools during the course of the incident which primarily consisted of webshells, proxy utilities, and file modifications to allow credential harvesting. Once UTA0178 had access into the network via the ICS VPN appliance, their general approach was to pivot from system to system using compromised credentials. They would then further compromise credentials of users on any new system that was breached, and use these credentials to log into additional systems via RDP. Volexity observed the attacker obtaining credentials in a variety of ways.

UserSec is a pro-Russian hacking group that has been active since at least 2022. The group is known for its DDoS attacks and has collaborated with other pro-Russian hacking groups. In May 2023, UserSec announced a cyber campaign targeting NATO member states and joined forces with KillNet to launch attacks against NATO.

USDoD is a threat actor known for leaking large databases of personal information, including from companies like Airbus and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. They have a history of engaging in high-profile data breaches, such as exposing data from the FBI's InfraGard program. USDoD has also been involved in web scraping to obtain information from websites like LinkedIn.

What sets Urpage attacks apart is its targeting of InPage, a word processor for Urdu and Arabic languages. However, its Delphi backdoor component, which it has in common with Confucius and Patchwork, and its apparent use of Bahamut-like malware, is what makes it more intriguing as it connects Urpage to these other known threats. Trend Micro covered the Delphi component in the context of the Confucius and Patchwork connection. They mentioned Urpage as a third unnamed threat actor connected to the two.

UnsolicitedBooker is a China-aligned APT group known for its persistent targeting of an unnamed international organization in Saudi Arabia, employing a backdoor called MarsSnake. The group utilizes spear-phishing emails, often featuring flight tickets as decoys, to infiltrate governmental organizations across Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. Their operations have included multiple intrusion attempts over several years, demonstrating a sustained interest in their target. MarsSnake provides significant control over infected machines, allowing for arbitrary command execution and file access.

This threat actor compromises civil society groups the Chinese Communist Party views as hostile to its interests, such as Tibetan, Uyghur, Hong Kong, and Taiwanese activist. The threat actor also targeted the Myanmar electoral commission.

Between March and June 2025, Proofpoint identified multiple China-aligned threat actors specifically targeting Taiwanese organizations within the semiconductor industry. This included a China-aligned threat actor tracked as UNK_FistBump targeting semiconductor design, manufacturing, and supply chain organizations in employment-themed phishing campaigns resulting in the delivery of Cobalt Strike or the custom Voldemort backdoor. Additionally, Proofpoint observed another China-aligned threat actor tracked as UNK_DropPitch targeting individuals in multiple major investment firms who specialize in investment analysis specifically within the Taiwanese semiconductor industry. This UNK_DropPitch targeting is exemplary of intelligence collection priorities spanning less obvious areas of the semiconductor ecosystem beyond just design and manufacturing entities. Finally, we also observed an actor tracked as UNK_SparkyCarp conducting credential phishing activity against a Taiwanese semiconductor company using a custom Adversary in the Middle (AiTM) phishing kit.

UNK_RemoteRogue is a suspected Russian threat actor that has been observed utilizing ClickFix in its infection chains, although this technique is not revolutionizing their operations but rather replacing existing installation methods. The group has a history of employing compromised intermediate mailservers, with specific infrastructure noted, such as the upstream concentrator at 80.66.66[.]197. Proofpoint recorded their use of ClickFix only once before they reverted to traditional campaigns that share similar characteristics, including targeting and infrastructure. UNK_RemoteRogue has been linked to phishing activities and has shown consistent patterns in its operational tactics.

Between March and June 2025, Proofpoint identified multiple China-aligned threat actors specifically targeting Taiwanese organizations within the semiconductor industry. This included a China-aligned threat actor tracked as UNK_FistBump targeting semiconductor design, manufacturing, and supply chain organizations in employment-themed phishing campaigns resulting in the delivery of Cobalt Strike or the custom Voldemort backdoor. Additionally, Proofpoint observed another China-aligned threat actor tracked as UNK_DropPitch targeting individuals in multiple major investment firms who specialize in investment analysis specifically within the Taiwanese semiconductor industry. This UNK_DropPitch targeting is exemplary of intelligence collection priorities spanning less obvious areas of the semiconductor ecosystem beyond just design and manufacturing entities. Finally, we also observed an actor tracked as UNK_SparkyCarp conducting credential phishing activity against a Taiwanese semiconductor company using a custom Adversary in the Middle (AiTM) phishing kit.

Between March and June 2025, Proofpoint identified multiple China-aligned threat actors specifically targeting Taiwanese organizations within the semiconductor industry. This included a China-aligned threat actor tracked as UNK_FistBump targeting semiconductor design, manufacturing, and supply chain organizations in employment-themed phishing campaigns resulting in the delivery of Cobalt Strike or the custom Voldemort backdoor. Additionally, Proofpoint observed another China-aligned threat actor tracked as UNK_DropPitch targeting individuals in multiple major investment firms who specialize in investment analysis specifically within the Taiwanese semiconductor industry. This UNK_DropPitch targeting is exemplary of intelligence collection priorities spanning less obvious areas of the semiconductor ecosystem beyond just design and manufacturing entities. Finally, we also observed an actor tracked as UNK_SparkyCarp conducting credential phishing activity against a Taiwanese semiconductor company using a custom Adversary in the Middle (AiTM) phishing kit.

UNK_AcademicFlare is a suspected Russia-aligned threat actor that conducts device code phishing campaigns by leveraging compromised email addresses from government and military organizations. The actor engages in rapport building through benign outreach, ultimately leading to a phishing attempt via a Cloudflare Worker URL that spoofs a OneDrive account. Targeted sectors include government, think tanks, higher education, and transportation in the U.S. and Europe, with a focus on Russia and Ukraine-themed content. Their tactics include using compromised accounts for initial contact and employing device code phishing techniques to extract credentials.

Threat actor tracked by Malpedia.

Adversary targeting manufacturing and industrial organizations.

Threat actor tracked by Malpedia.

UNG0901 is a cyber-espionage threat actor targeting Russian entities, particularly in the aerospace and defense sectors, utilizing spear-phishing tactics. They deploy the EAGLET backdoor, which exhibits functionalities similar to the Golang-based PhantomDL used by the Head Mare group, including shell, download, and upload capabilities. Notable overlaps in file-naming conventions and targeting strategies further reinforce the connection between UNG0901 and Head Mare.

UNG0002 is a technically adept APT conducting large-scale cyber espionage campaigns targeting strategic sectors in China, Hong Kong, and Pakistan, including defense, energy infrastructure, and healthcare. The group employs LNK shortcuts, VBScript files, and tools like Cobalt Strike and Metasploit, utilizing phishing emails with deceptive documents to lure victims. Their malware, such as Shadow RAT, leverages DLL Sideloading and supports remote command execution, making detection challenging. Analysts suggest that UNG0002 may originate from South or Southeast Asia, highlighting their resilience and adaptability in cyber operations.

Unfading Sea Haze is a threat actor focused on espionage, targeting government and military organizations in the South China Sea region since 2018. They employ spear-phishing emails with malicious attachments to gain initial access, followed by the deployment of custom malware such as Gh0st RAT variants and SharpJSHandler. The group utilizes scheduled tasks and manipulates local administrator accounts for persistence, while also incorporating Remote Monitoring and Management tools into their attacks. Unfading Sea Haze demonstrates a sophisticated and patient approach, remaining undetected for years and showing adaptability through evolving exfiltration tactics and malware arsenal.