Threat Intelligence Directory

On April 7, 2017, Pytor Levashov — who predominantly used the alias Severa or Peter Severa and whom Falcon Intelligence tracks as ZOMBIE SPIDER — was arrested in an international law enforcement operation led by the FBI. ZOMBIE SPIDER’s specialty was large-scale spam distribution, a fundamental component of cybercrime operations. Levashov was the primary threat actor behind a botnet known as Kelihos and its predecessors, Waledac and Storm. In addition to Levashov’s arrest, there was a technical operation conducted by Falcon Intelligence to seize control of the Kelihos botnet.

ZeroSevenGroup is a threat actor that claims to have breached a U.S. branch of Toyota, stealing 240GB of sensitive data, including employee and customer information, contracts, and financial details. They have also allegedly gained full network access to critical Israeli infrastructure, with access to 80TB of sensitive data across various sectors. The group has threatened to use the stolen data for malicious activities, including ransomware attacks. Their operations involve exploiting vulnerabilities, as indicated by their reference to manipulating memory through buffer overflow techniques.

Zarya is a pro-Russian hacktivist group that emerged in March 2022. Initially operating as a special forces unit under the command of Killnet, Zarya has since become an independent entity. The group is primarily known for engaging in Denial-of-Service attacks, website defacement campaigns, and data leaks. Zarya targets government agencies, service providers, critical infrastructure, and civil service employees, both domestically and internationally.

YoroTrooper’s main targets are government or energy organizations in Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and other Commonwealth of Independent States, based on Cisco Talos analysis. YoroTrooper was also observed compromising accounts from at least two international organizations: a critical European Union health care agency and the World Intellectual Property Organization. Successful compromises also included Embassies of European countries including Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan.

RiskIQ characterizes the Yanbian Gang as a group that targeted South Korean Android mobile banking customers since 2013 with malicious Android apps purporting to be from major banks, namely Shinhan Savings Bank, Saemaul Geumgo, Shinhan Finance, KB Kookmin Bank, and NH Savings Bank.

XinXin is a Chinese-speaking threat actor known for its phishing-as-a-service platform, Lucid, which targets global organizations to steal credit card details and personally identifiable information through smishing campaigns. The group employs advanced techniques such as exploiting Rich Communication Services and Apple's iMessage protocol to bypass traditional SMS filters. XinXin also develops and utilizes other phishing kits like Lighthouse and Darcula, facilitating large-scale phishing operations with automated tools and evasion techniques. The group operates a structured hierarchy and monetizes stolen data while actively supporting the development of similar PhaaS services.

Xiaoqiying is a primarily Chinese-speaking threat group that is most well known for conducting website defacement and data exfiltration attacks on more than a dozen South Korean research and academic institutions in late-January 2023. Research from Recorded Futures Insikt Group has found that the groups affiliated threat actors have signaled a new round of cyberattacks against organizations in Japan and Taiwan. Although it shows no clear ties to the Chinese government, Xiaoqiying is staunchly pro-China and vows to target NATO countries as well as any country or region that is deemed hostile to China.

Cloud security company Lacework says it discovered a threat actor group named Xcatze that uses a Python named AndroxGh0st to take over AWS servers and send out massive email spam campaigns. Lacework says the malware operates by scanning web apps written in the Laravel PHP framework for exposed configuration files to identify and steal server credentials. Researchers said AndroxGh0st specifically searches for AWS, SendGrid, and Twilio credentials, which it uses to take control of email servers and accounts and send out the spam campaigns.

XakNet is a self-proclaimed hacktivist group that has targeted Ukraine. They claim to be comprised of Russian patriotic volunteers and have conducted various threat activities, including DDoS attacks, compromises, data leaks, and website defacements. They coordinate their operations with other hacktivist groups and have connections to APT28, a cyber espionage group sponsored by the GRU.

Worok is a cyber espionage group, mostly targeting Central Asia. The group toolset includes a C++ loader named CLRLoad, a PowerShell backdoor named PowHeartBeat, and a C# loader named PNGLoad.

FIN4 is a financially-motivated threat group that has targeted confidential information related to the public financial market, particularly regarding healthcare and pharmaceutical companies, since at least 2013. FIN4 is unique in that they do not infect victims with typical persistent malware, but rather they focus on capturing credentials authorized to access email and other non-public correspondence.

Witchetty was first documented by ESET in April 2022, who concluded that it was one of three sub-groups of TA410, a broad cyber-espionage operation with some links to the Cicada group (aka APT10). Witchetty’s activity was characterized by the use of two pieces of malware, a first-stage backdoor known as X4 and a second-stage payload known as LookBack. ESET reported that the group had targeted governments, diplomatic missions, charities, and industrial/manufacturing organizations.

[WIRTE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0090) is a cyberespionage actor, believed to be a subgroup of the Hamas-affiliated Gaza Cybergang, that has been active since at least August 2018. [WIRTE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0090) has targeted diplomatic, financial, military, legal, and technology organizations across the Middle East, North Africa, and in Europe to gather intelligence. [WIRTE](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0090) has remained persistently active despite the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict and has expanded their operations to include wiper malware attacks against Israeli targets.(Citation: Lab52 WIRTE Apr 2019)(Citation: Kaspersky WIRTE November 2021)(Citation: Check Point Wirte NOV 2024)(Citation: Palo Alto Ashen Lepus DEC 2025)

WIP19 is a Chinese-speaking threat group involved in espionage targeting the Middle East and Asia. They utilize a stolen certificate to sign their malware, including SQLMaggie, ScreenCap, and a credential dumper. The group has been observed targeting telecommunications and IT service providers, using toolsets authored by WinEggDrop. WIP19's activities suggest they are after specific information and are part of the broader Chinese espionage landscape.

Winter Vivern is a group linked to Russian and Belorussian interests active since at least 2020 targeting various European government and NGO entities, along with sporadic targeting of Indian and US victims. The group leverages a combination of document-based phishing activity and server-side exploitation for initial access, leveraging adversary-controlled and -created infrastructure for follow-on command and control.(Citation: DomainTools WinterVivern 2021)(Citation: SentinelOne WinterVivern 2023)(Citation: CERT-UA WinterVivern 2023)(Citation: ESET WinterVivern 2023)(Citation: Proofpoint WinterVivern 2023)

In August of 2018, DarkMatter released a report entitled “In the Trails of WINDSHIFT APT”, which unveiled a threat actor with TTPs very similar to those of Bahamut. Subsequently, two additional articles were released by Objective-See which provide an analysis of some validated WINDSHIFT samples targeting OSX systems. Pivoting on specific file attributes and infrastructure indicators, Unit 42 was able to identify and correlate additional attacker activity and can now provide specific details on a targeted WINDSHIFT attack as it unfolded at a Middle Eastern government agency.

WildPressure is a threat actor that targets industrial-related entities in the Middle East. They use a variety of programming languages, including C++, VBScript, and Python, to develop their malware. They have been observed using virtual private servers and compromised servers, particularly WordPress websites, in their infrastructure. While there are some minor similarities with other threat actors in the region, there is not enough evidence to make any attribution.

A corporate espionage group has compromised a string of major corporations over the past three years in order to steal confidential information and intellectual property. The gang, which Symantec calls Butterfly, is not-state sponsored, rather financially motivated. It has attacked multi-billion dollar companies operating in the internet, IT software, pharmaceutical, and commodities sectors. Twitter, Facebook, Apple, and Microsoft are among the companies who have publicly acknowledged attacks. Butterfly is technically proficient and well resourced. The group has developed a suite of custom malware tools capable of attacking both Windows and Apple computers, and appears to have used at least one zero-day vulnerability in its attacks. It keeps a low profile and maintains good operational security. After successfully compromising a target organization, it cleans up after itself before moving on to its next target. This group operates at a much higher level than the average cybercrime gang. It is not interested in stealing credit card details or customer databases and is instead focused on high-level corporate information. Butterfly may be selling this information to the highest bidder or may be operating as hackers for hire. Stolen information could also be used for insider-trading purposes.

Wildcard is a threat actor that initially targeted Israel's educational sector with the SysJoker malware. They have since expanded their operations and developed additional malware variants, disguised as legitimate software, including one written in the Rust programming language called RustDown. Their precise identity remains unknown, but they have shown advanced capabilities and a focus on critical sectors within Israel.

As a part of our Kaspersky APT Intelligence Reporting subscription, customers received an update in mid-February 2017 on some interesting APT activity that we called WhiteBear. Much of the contents of that report are reproduced here. WhiteBear is a parallel project or second stage of the Skipper Turla cluster of activity documented in another private intelligence report “Skipper Turla – the White Atlas framework” from mid-2016. Like previous Turla activity, WhiteBear leverages compromised websites and hijacked satellite connections for command and control (C2) infrastructure. As a matter of fact, WhiteBear infrastructure has overlap with other Turla campaigns, like those deploying Kopiluwak, as documented in “KopiLuwak – A New JavaScript Payload from Turla” in December 2016. WhiteBear infected systems maintained a dropper (which was typically signed) as well as a complex malicious platform which was always preceded by WhiteAtlas module deployment attempts. However, despite the similarities to previous Turla campaigns, we believe that WhiteBear is a distinct project with a separate focus. We note that this observation of delineated target focus, tooling, and project context is an interesting one that also can be repeated across broadly labeled Turla and Sofacy activity. From February to September 2016, WhiteBear activity was narrowly focused on embassies and consular operations around the world. All of these early WhiteBear targets were related to embassies and diplomatic/foreign affair organizations. Continued WhiteBear activity later shifted to include defense-related organizations into June 2017. When compared to WhiteAtlas infections, WhiteBear deployments are relatively rare and represent a departure from the broader Skipper Turla target set. Additionally, a comparison of the WhiteAtlas framework to WhiteBear components indicates that the malware is the product of separate development efforts. WhiteBear infections appear to be preceded by a condensed spearphishing dropper, lack Firefox extension installer payloads, and contain several new components signed with a new code signing digital certificate, unlike WhiteAtlas incidents and modules.

[Whitefly](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0107) is a cyber espionage group that has been operating since at least 2017. The group has targeted organizations based mostly in Singapore across a wide variety of sectors, and is primarily interested in stealing large amounts of sensitive information. The group has been linked to an attack against Singapore’s largest public health organization, SingHealth.(Citation: Symantec Whitefly March 2019)

WhiteCobra is a threat actor that has infiltrated the Visual Studio Code marketplace and Open VSX registry, deploying 24 malicious extensions targeting cryptocurrency development tools, particularly Solidity. The group employs social engineering tactics, manipulates download counts and reviews, and uses fake branding to establish credibility for their extensions, which deliver LummaStealer on Windows and unknown malware on macOS. WhiteCobra has been linked to a $500,000 cryptocurrency theft in July 2025 and maintains detailed playbooks with revenue targets, showcasing their organized and persistent operations. Despite ongoing efforts by security researchers to remove their malicious extensions, WhiteCobra continues to upload new threats weekly, highlighting the sophistication of their TTPs.

Threat actor tracked by Malpedia.

WeRedEvils is a hacking group that has claimed responsibility for multiple cyber attacks. They targeted the Iranian Electric Grid and the Tasnimnews website, causing the latter to go offline. The group also claimed to have hacked into Iran's oil infrastructure, causing significant damage. They emerged in response to the Hamas massacre and are believed to be a group of Israeli cyber experts.

WeedSec is a threat actor group that recently targeted the online learning and course management platform Moodle. They posted sample databases of Moodle on their Telegram channel, which is widely used by educational institutions and workplaces.

Space Pirates is a cybercrime group that has been active since at least 2017. They primarily target Russian companies and have been observed using various malware, including Deed RAT and ShadowPad. The group uses a combination of publicly available tools and their own protocols to communicate with their command-and-control servers.

The 8220 Gang, also known as Water Sigbin, is a threat actor group that focuses on deploying cryptocurrency-mining malware. They exploit vulnerabilities in Oracle WebLogic servers, such as CVE-2017-3506 and CVE-2023-21839, to deliver cryptocurrency miners using PowerShell scripts. The group has demonstrated a sophisticated multistage loading technique to deploy the PureCrypter loader and XMRIG crypto miner. They are known for using obfuscation techniques, such as hexadecimal encoding and code obfuscation, to evade detection and compromise systems.

Water Saci is a sophisticated cyber threat actor operating in Brazil, utilizing a multi-format attack chain that includes HTA files, ZIP archives, and PDFs to bypass security measures. The campaign employs an email-based C&C infrastructure using IMAP connections to terra.com.br accounts, enhancing its resilience and evasion tactics. It leverages social engineering through WhatsApp to propagate malware, specifically the SORVEPOTEL banking trojan, and incorporates advanced techniques for infection and persistence. The modular architecture of the malware allows for dynamic adaptation and extraction of sensitive credentials, indicating a significant evolution in adversarial capabilities.

Water Orthrus is a threat actor known for distributing CopperStealer and CopperPhish malware. They target Microsoft 365 users with phishing campaigns to steal credit card information. The actor has evolved their malware to include rootkits for stealthy installations and has shifted their focus from personal information to cryptocurrency and credit card data. Water Orthrus has been linked to the Scranos campaign reported in 2019.

Water Makara employs the Astaroth banking malware, which features a new defense evasion technique. Their spear phishing campaigns exploit human error by targeting users to click on malicious files. To mitigate these threats, organizations should implement regular security training, enforce strong password policies, utilize multifactor authentication (MFA), keep security solutions updated, and apply the principle of least privilege.

Trend Micro discovered a threat actor they named Water Labbu that was targeting cryptocurrency scam websites. Typically, cryptocurrency scammers use social engineering techniques, interacting with victims to gain their trust and then manipulating them into providing the permissions needed to transfer cryptocurrency assets. While Water Labbu managed to steal cryptocurrencies via a similar method by obtaining access permissions and token allowances from their victim’s wallets, unlike other similar campaigns, they did not use any kind of social engineering — at least not directly. Instead, Water Labbu lets other scammers use their social engineering tricks to scam unsuspecting victims.

Water Kurita is a financially motivated cybercriminal entity associated with the Lumma Stealer infostealer-as-a-service operation, primarily active on underground forums and marketplaces. It focuses on credential and information theft at scale, monetizing access via subscription-based malware distribution and resale of stolen data to other actors. The group demonstrates solid operational security and marketing tactics typical of mature MaaS ecosystems, although a 2025 doxxing campaign exposing alleged core members (personal and financial data) significantly disrupted its activity and drove customers toward competing infostealers.

Water Gamayun exploits the MSC EvilTwin zero-day vulnerability to compromise systems and exfiltrate data, utilizing custom payloads and advanced data exfiltration techniques. Their arsenal includes backdoors like SilentPrism and DarkWisp, as well as information stealers such as Stealc and Rhadamanthys. They employ delivery methods like provisioning malicious payloads through signed Microsoft Installer files and leveraging LOLBins to maintain persistence and control over infected systems. Comprehensive analysis of their command-and-control infrastructure reveals sophisticated evasion techniques and dynamic control capabilities.

With its emergence in 2022, Water Curupira has established itself as a persistent threat actor targeting organizations primarily in South America and Europe. Their modus operandi involves a combination of social engineering tactics and a diversified malware arsenal, including ransomware variants like Black Basta and credential stealers like Cobalt Strike. This multifaceted approach enables them to gain unauthorized access to victim systems, steal sensitive data, and ultimately extort victims through ransomware demands. It has been actively using Pikabot, a loader malware with similarities to Qakbot, in spam campaigns throughout 2023.

Water Barghest is a cybercriminal group that has compromised over 20,000 IoT devices by October 2024, monetizing them through a residential proxy marketplace. They automate the entire process from identifying vulnerable devices using n-day and zero-day exploits to deploying Ngioweb malware and selling the compromised assets. Their operations include leveraging Ubiquiti EdgeRouter devices for espionage and utilizing automated scripts to exploit vulnerabilities within minutes of discovery. Water Barghest has maintained a low profile for years, but their activities gained attention due to the deployment of a zero-day vulnerability against Cisco IOS XE devices in October 2023.

Water Bakunawa is a cybercriminal group identified by Trend Micro, responsible for the RansomHub ransomware, which exploits the Zerologon vulnerability to gain unauthorized network access. The group employs EDRKillShifter to evade detection and disrupt security monitoring processes, utilizing advanced anti-EDR techniques. Their targets include sectors such as water and wastewater, IT, healthcare, and financial services. Members of the group and related affiliates have linked by association with other high-profile RaaS groups like Scattered Spider and ALPHV.

Thief Libra is a cloud-focused threat group that has a history of cryptojacking operations as well as cloud service platform credential scraping. They were first known to operate on January 27, 2019. They use a variety of custom build Go Scripts as well as repurposed cryptojacking scripts from other groups including TeamTNT. They are currently considered to be an opportunistic threat group that targets exposed cloud instances and applications.

WASSONITE is a North Korea-linked APT that has targeted industrial sectors, including electric generation, nuclear energy, manufacturing, and research entities in India, South Korea, and Japan since at least 2018. The group employs DTrack RAT for remote access, Mimikatz for credential capture, and various system tools for lateral movement and file transfers. WASSONITE has been observed using nuclear energy-themed spear phishing lures to deploy the AppleSeed backdoor, which can take screenshots, log keystrokes, and execute commands from a C2 server. Their operations focus on initial access, reconnaissance, and data collection without demonstrating disruptive capabilities.

WARP PANDA is a China-nexus APT that targets VMware vCenter environments and Microsoft Azure infrastructures, primarily focusing on legal, technology, and manufacturing sectors in the U.S. The group exploits internet-facing edge devices for initial access, later pivoting to vCenter environments using compromised credentials or vulnerabilities. Their toolkit includes the BRICKSTORM backdoor, along with implants like Junction and GuestConduit, which facilitate command execution and network traffic tunneling. WARP PANDA demonstrates advanced OPSEC and aims for long-term persistence and data exfiltration aligned with the interests of the People's Republic of China.

VulzSec, also known as VulzSecTeam, is a hacktivist group that has been involved in various cyber-attacks. They have targeted government websites in retaliation for issues such as police brutality and the treatment of Indian Muslims. The group has been involved in campaigns like OpIndia2.0, where they planned to launch DDoS attacks on Indian government websites.