Threat Intelligence Directory

Ghostr is a financially motivated threat actor known for stealing a confidential database containing 5.3 million records from the World-Check and leaking about 186GB of data from a stock trading platform. They have been active on Breachforums.is, revealing massive data breaches involving comprehensive details of Thai users, including full names, phone numbers, email addresses, and ID card numbers.

Cyber espionage is an issue whose time has come. In this second report from the Information Warfare Monitor, we lay out the findings of a 10-month investigation of alleged Chinese cyber spying against Tibetan institutions. The investigation, consisting of fieldwork, technical scouting, and laboratory analysis, discovered a lot more. The investigation ultimately uncovered a network of over 1,295 infected hosts in 103 countries. Up to 30% of the infected hosts are considered high-value targets and include computers located at ministries of foreign affairs, embassies, international organizations, news media, and NGOs. The Tibetan computer systems we manually investigated, and from which our investigations began, were conclusively compromised by multiple infections that gave attackers unprecedented access to potentially sensitive information. Attacks on the Dalai Lama’s Private Office The OHHDL started to suspect it was under surveillance while setting up meetings be-tween His Holiness and foreign dignitaries. They sent an email invitation on behalf of His Holiness to a foreign diplomat, but before they could follow it up with a courtesy telephone call, the diplomat’s office was contacted by the Chinese government and warned not to go ahead with the meeting. The Tibetans wondered whether a computer compromise might be the explanation; they called ONI Asia who called us. (Until May 2008, the first author was employed on a studentship funded by the OpenNet Initiative and the second author was a principal investigator for ONI.)

[Gelsemium](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0141) is a cyberespionage group that has been active since at least 2014, targeting governmental institutions, electronics manufacturers, universities, and religious organizations in East Asia and the Middle East.(Citation: ESET Gelsemium June 2021)

From November 2017 to October 2018, we attributed 14 campaigns to the GC threat actors that used a specific MaaS provider (hereinafter “the Provider”) offered by a known individual (hereinafter “the Provider Operator”).

GambleForce is a threat actor specializing in SQL injection attacks. They have targeted over 20 websites in various sectors across multiple countries, compromising six companies. GambleForce utilizes publicly available pentesting tools and has been active since mid-September 2023.

GamaCopy is a threat actor first discovered in June 2023, known for launching cyberattacks against Russia’s defense and critical infrastructure sectors by mimicking the TTPs of Gamaredon. The organization has been active since at least August 2021 and primarily uses Russian-language bait documents related to military facilities. Analysis of attack samples shows considerable overlap in code structure and tactics, including the use of 7z-SFX documentation to install UltraVNC and connecting via port 443. GamaCopy employs open-source tools to obfuscate its activities while targeting sensitive information in the context of the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

[Gallmaker](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0084) is a cyberespionage group that has targeted victims in the Middle East and has been active since at least December 2017. The group has mainly targeted victims in the defense, military, and government sectors.(Citation: Symantec Gallmaker Oct 2018)

[GALLIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0093) is a cyberespionage group that has been active since at least 2012, primarily targeting telecommunications companies, financial institutions, and government entities in Afghanistan, Australia, Belgium, Cambodia, Malaysia, Mozambique, the Philippines, Russia, and Vietnam. This group is particularly known for launching Operation Soft Cell, a long-term campaign targeting telecommunications providers.(Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019) Security researchers have identified [GALLIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0093) as a likely Chinese state-sponsored group, based in part on tools used and TTPs commonly associated with Chinese threat actors.(Citation: Cybereason Soft Cell June 2019)(Citation: Microsoft GALLIUM December 2019)(Citation: Unit 42 PingPull Jun 2022)

Throughout 2017 and 2018, Fxmsp established a network of trusted proxy resellers to promote their breaches on the criminal underground. Some of the known Fxmsp TTPs included accessing network environments via externally available remote desktop protocol (RDP) servers and exposed active directory. Most recently, the actor claimed to have developed a credential-stealing botnet capable of infecting high-profile targets in order to exfiltrate sensitive usernames and passwords. Fxmsp has claimed that developing this botnet and improving its capabilities for stealing information from secured systems is their main goal.

The CYFIRMA research team has identified a new up-and-coming European threat actor group known as FusionCore. Running Malware-as-a-service, along with the hacker-for- hire operation, they have a wide variety of tools and services that are being offered on their website, making it a one-stop-shop for threat actors looking to purchase cost- effective yet customizable malware. The operators have started a ransomware affiliate program that equips the attackers with the ransomware and affiliate software to manage victims. FusionCore typically provides sellers with a detailed set of instructions for any service or product being sold, enabling individuals with minimal experience to carry out complex attacks.

FrostyNeighbor is a Belarus-aligned APT group known for conducting influence and disinformation campaigns, particularly targeting Ukraine, Poland, and Lithuania. They have compromised various governmental and private sector entities, including the Polish Anti-Doping Agency, through hack-and-leak operations. The group is believed to collaborate with initial access brokers to exploit high-value targets, utilizing techniques such as zero-day vulnerabilities. Their operations are linked to cyber-enabled disinformation campaigns critical of the North Atlantic Alliance.

[Fox Kitten](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0117) is threat actor with a suspected nexus to the Iranian government that has been active since at least 2017 against entities in the Middle East, North Africa, Europe, Australia, and North America. [Fox Kitten](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0117) has targeted multiple industrial verticals including oil and gas, technology, government, defense, healthcare, manufacturing, and engineering.(Citation: ClearkSky Fox Kitten February 2020)(Citation: CrowdStrike PIONEER KITTEN August 2020)(Citation: Dragos PARISITE )(Citation: ClearSky Pay2Kitten December 2020)

Adversary group targeting telecommunication and technology organizations.

FlyingYeti is a Russia-aligned threat actor targeting Ukrainian military entities. They conduct reconnaissance activities and launch phishing campaigns using malware like COOKBOX. FlyingYeti exploits the WinRAR vulnerability CVE-2023-38831 to infect targets with malicious payloads. Cloudforce One has successfully disrupted their operations and provided recommendations for defense against their phishing campaigns.

Flax Typhoon is a Chinese state-sponsored threat actor that primarily targets organizations in Taiwan. They conduct espionage campaigns and focus on gaining and maintaining long-term access to networks using minimal malware. Flax Typhoon relies on tools built into the operating system and legitimate software to remain undetected. They exploit vulnerabilities in public-facing servers, use living-off-the-land techniques, and deploy a VPN connection to maintain persistence and move laterally within compromised networks.

This suspected Iran-based adversary conducted long-running SWC campaigns from December 2016 until public disclosure in July 2018. Like other Iran-based actors, the target scope for FLASH KITTEN appears to be focused on the MENA region.

Verticals targeted during Operation FishMedley include governments, NGOs, and think tanks, across Asia, Europe, and the United States. ; Operators used implants – such as ShadowPad, SodaMaster, and Spyder – that are common or exclusive to China-aligned threat actors. ; We assess with high confidence that Operation FishMedley was conducted by the FishMonger APT group.

Fishing Elephant is a threat actor that primarily targets victims in Bangladesh and Pakistan. They rely on consistent TTPs, including payload and communication patterns, while occasionally incorporating new techniques such as geo-fencing and hiding executables within certificate files. Their tool of choice is AresRAT, which they deliver through platforms like Heroku and Dropbox. Recently, they have shifted their focus to government and diplomatic entities in Turkey, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Ukraine, and China.

[FIN8](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0061) is a financially motivated threat group that has been active since at least January 2016, and known for targeting organizations in the hospitality, retail, entertainment, insurance, technology, chemical, and financial sectors. In June 2021, security researchers detected [FIN8](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0061) switching from targeting point-of-sale (POS) devices to distributing a number of ransomware variants.(Citation: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017)(Citation: FireEye Fin8 May 2016)(Citation: Bitdefender Sardonic Aug 2021)(Citation: Symantec FIN8 Jul 2023)

[FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) is a financially-motivated threat group that has been active since 2013. [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) has targeted the retail, restaurant, hospitality, software, consulting, financial services, medical equipment, cloud services, media, food and beverage, transportation, pharmaceutical, and utilities industries in the United States. A portion of [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) was operated out of a front company called Combi Security and often used point-of-sale malware for targeting efforts. Since 2020, [FIN7](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0046) shifted operations to big game hunting (BGH), including use of [REvil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0496) ransomware and their own Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS), Darkside. FIN7 may be linked to the [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0008) Group, but multiple threat groups have been observed using [Carbanak](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0030), leading these groups to be tracked separately.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 April 2017)(Citation: FireEye CARBANAK June 2017)(Citation: FireEye FIN7 Aug 2018)(Citation: CrowdStrike Carbon Spider August 2021)(Citation: Mandiant FIN7 Apr 2022)(Citation: BiZone Lizar May 2021)

[FIN6](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0037) is a cyber crime group that has stolen payment card data and sold it for profit on underground marketplaces. This group has aggressively targeted and compromised point of sale (PoS) systems in the hospitality and retail sectors.(Citation: FireEye FIN6 April 2016)(Citation: FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019)

[FIN5](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0053) is a financially motivated threat group that has targeted personally identifiable information and payment card information. The group has been active since at least 2008 and has targeted the restaurant, gaming, and hotel industries. The group is made up of actors who likely speak Russian. (Citation: FireEye Respond Webinar July 2017) (Citation: Mandiant FIN5 GrrCON Oct 2016) (Citation: DarkReading FireEye FIN5 Oct 2015)

[FIN13](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1016) is a financially motivated cyber threat group that has targeted the financial, retail, and hospitality industries in Mexico and Latin America, as early as 2016. [FIN13](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1016) achieves its objectives by stealing intellectual property, financial data, mergers and acquisition information, or PII.(Citation: Mandiant FIN13 Aug 2022)(Citation: Sygnia Elephant Beetle Jan 2022)

FIN11 is a well-established financial crime group that has recently focused its operations on ransomware and extortion. The group has been active since 2017 and has been tracked under UNC902 and later on as TEMP.Warlok. In some ways, FIN11 is reminiscent of APT1; they are notable not for their sophistication, but for their sheer volume of activity.(FireEye) Mandiant has also responded to numerous FIN11 intrusions, but we’ve only observed the group successfully monetize access in few instances. This could suggest that the actors cast a wide net during their phishing operations, then choose which victims to further exploit based on characteristics such as sector, geolocation or perceived security posture. Recently, FIN11 has deployed CLOP ransomware and threatened to publish exfiltrated data to pressure victims into paying ransom demands. The group’s shifting monetization methods—from point-of-sale (POS) malware in 2018, to ransomware in 2019, and hybrid extortion in 2020—is part of a larger trend in which criminal actors have increasingly focused on post-compromise ransomware deployment and data theft extortion. Notably, FIN11 includes a subset of the activity security researchers call TA505, Graceful Spider, Gold Evergreen, but we do not attribute TA505’s early operations to FIN11 and caution against using the names interchangeably. Attribution of both historic TA505 activity and more recent FIN11 activity is complicated by the actors’ use of criminal service providers. Like most financially motivated actors, FIN11 doesn’t operate in a vacuum. We believe that the group has used services that provide anonymous domain registration, bulletproof hosting, code signing certificates, and private or semi-private malware. Outsourcing work to these criminal service providers likely enables FIN11 to increase the scale and sophistication of their operations.

[FIN10](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0051) is a financially motivated threat group that has targeted organizations in North America since at least 2013 through 2016. The group uses stolen data exfiltrated from victims to extort organizations. (Citation: FireEye FIN10 June 2017)

FireEye first identified this activity during a recent investigation at an organization in the financial industry. They identified the presence of a financially motivated threat group that they track as FIN1, whose activity at the organization dated back several years. The threat group deployed numerous malicious files and utilities, all of which were part of a malware ecosystem referred to as ‘Nemesis’ by the malware developer(s), and used this malware to access the victim environment and steal cardholder data. FIN1, which may be located in Russia or a Russian-speaking country based on language settings in many of their custom tools, is known for stealing data that is easily monetized from financial services organizations such as banks, credit unions, ATM operations, and financial transaction processing and financial business services companies.

[Ferocious Kitten](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0137) is a threat group that has primarily targeted Persian-speaking individuals in Iran since at least 2015.(Citation: Kaspersky Ferocious Kitten Jun 2021)

Femwar02 is a previously unknown pro-Russian ransomware threat actor that emerged in early 2026, linked to a major cyberattack on Italy's Sapienza University of Rome in February 2026, which caused a full network shutdown and operational disruptions. The group deploys Bablock (also known as Rorschach), a next-generation ransomware strain first identified in 2023 that features fast hybrid encryption (curve25519 and hc-128), partial file encryption for speed, direct system calls to evade detection, and domain-wide propagation via Group Policy on Windows Domain Controllers. Bablock shares code similarities with LockBit 2.0 but incorporates elements from other families like Babuk and DarkSide, often delivered via encrypted payloads, DLL sideloading with tools like DarkLoader, and exploits such as those in Zimbra or phishing. Notably, the malware skips encrypting files written in Russian, reinforcing its pro-Russian alignment, with no prior attributions or campaigns documented before the Sapienza incident.

Fail0verflow is a hacking group known for exploiting vulnerabilities in gaming consoles, notably the Nintendo Wii and PlayStation 3. They utilized techniques such as RAM shorting, buffer overflow, and a signing bug to achieve code execution and develop the Homebrew Channel for the Wii. In 2010, they compromised an ECDSA key for the PS3, and later announced the retrieval of PS5 symmetric root keys, enabling the potential for custom firmware and homebrew software. Their exploits often involve kernel access and have raised concerns about the implications for piracy and litigation in the gaming community.

[EXOTIC LILY](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1011) is a financially motivated group that has been closely linked with [Wizard Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0102) and the deployment of ransomware including [Conti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0575) and [Diavol](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0659). [EXOTIC LILY](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1011) may be acting as an initial access broker for other malicious actors, and has targeted a wide range of industries including IT, cybersecurity, and healthcare since at least September 2021.(Citation: Google EXOTIC LILY March 2022)

ExCobalt is an APT group that has been active since at least 2016 and is believed to be linked to the notorious Cobalt Gang. The group primarily targets Russian organizations across sectors—including metallurgy, telecommunications, mining, information technology, government, and software development by exploiting supply chain weaknesses and compromised contractors for initial access. ExCobalt’s toolkit features a custom Golang‑based backdoor, GoRed, which enables remote command execution, credential harvesting, and detailed system reconnaissance, while the group also employs established tools such as Spark RAT, Mimikatz, and multiple Linux privilege escalation exploits. Researchers note that ExCobalt continually evolves its tactics and even modifies standard utilities to bypass security controls and maintain persistent access, underscoring its commitment to sophisticated cyberespionage and data theft operations.

[Indrik Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0119) is a Russia-based cybercriminal group that has been active since at least 2014. [Indrik Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0119) initially started with the [Dridex](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0384) banking Trojan, and then by 2017 they began running ransomware operations using [BitPaymer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0570), [WastedLocker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0612), and Hades ransomware. Following U.S. sanctions and an indictment in 2019, [Indrik Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0119) changed their tactics and diversified their toolset.(Citation: Crowdstrike Indrik November 2018)(Citation: Crowdstrike EvilCorp March 2021)(Citation: Treasury EvilCorp Dec 2019)

EvilWeb is a pro-Russian hacktivist group created in March 2024 that targets American and European entities using a hack-and-leak method alongside DDoS attacks. The group claims to have obtained data from various high-profile American organizations. EvilWeb announced its participation in the #FreeDurov operation on August 25, 2024, and began executing DDoS and hacking attacks. As of September 3, 2024, their Telegram channel has 1,146 members.

Malware experts at CSE Cybsec uncovered a massive malvertising campaign dubbed EvilTraffic leveraging tens of thousands compromised websites. Crooks exploited some CMS vulnerabilities to upload and execute arbitrary PHP pages used to generate revenues via advertising.

Threat actor tracked by Malpedia.

EvilByte is a hacktivist group that has conducted several high-profile cyber attacks in 2024, including breaching MyFatoorah's banking system in retaliation against Saudi media 1 and targeting Radio 10 Rosario in Argentina 2. The group has also claimed responsibility for breaching Israeli government websites and leaking data of government employees and intelligence agencies 4.

Evasive Panda is an APT group that has been active since at least 2012, conducting cyberespionage targeting individuals, government institutions and organizations.

The Equation Group is a highly sophisticated threat actor described by its discoverers at Kaspersky Labs as one of the most sophisticated cyber attack groups in the world, operating alongside but always from a position of superiority with the creators of Stuxnet and Flame

A Russian group that collects intelligence on the energy industry.

El Machete is one of these threats that was first publicly disclosed and named by Kaspersky here. We’ve found that this group has continued to operate successfully, predominantly in Latin America, since 2014. All attackers simply moved to new C2 infrastructure, based largely around dynamic DNS domains, in addition to making minimal changes to the malware in order to evade signature-based detection.