Threat Intelligence Directory

UNC6508 is a PRC-nexus threat actor targeting North American academic, medical, and military research institutions, employing tactics such as exploiting REDCap servers and deploying custom malware named INFINITERED. The actor utilized credential harvesting, internal reconnaissance, and a web shell named "help.php" for persistence. They also manipulated content compliance rules for covert data exfiltration, forwarding sensitive email communications to a threat actor-controlled Gmail address. GTIG attributes this espionage activity to UNC6508 with high confidence, based on infrastructure overlaps and specific targeting of defense and medical research sectors.

TA4922 is a Chinese-speaking cybercrime cluster that employs localized HR, payroll, tax, and invoice lures to deliver various malware families, including Atlas RAT, RomulusLoader, and SilentRunLoader. The actor conducts targeted email campaigns, often impersonating trusted authorities, to facilitate credential phishing and fraud. TA4922's operational tempo is high, with a focus on obtaining remote access for financial gain, and it has shown a rapid evolution in its malware arsenal. The group is also noted for using social engineering to shift communications from email to messaging platforms, enhancing their phishing efforts.

SLIME88 is a China-nexus APT that has exploited the critical vulnerability CVE-2026-34197 in Apache ActiveMQ to deploy SoxAgent RAT, compromising Linux devices and establishing an ORB network tracked as GOBLIN14. The group has targeted IT and manufacturing entities in the US, South Korea, India, and France. Additionally, SLIME88 has aimed at Taiwan’s energy sector using phishing emails and fake certificate installers to deploy backdoor programs like AdaptixC2 and CobaltStrike. They often utilize Cloudflare to obscure their C2 IP addresses, evading detection.

BlackMaskers Team has emerged as a significant threat actor, particularly targeting Jordan amid the Israel-Iran conflict. They have claimed responsibility for cyberattacks on critical Jordanian entities, including the stock exchange and private sector enterprises, leveraging techniques such as website defacement and data breaches. Their operations have raised concerns about the vulnerability of national infrastructure. Additionally, they have successfully hacked Saudi Arabian web platforms, further demonstrating their capabilities.

ZeffSec is a hacktivist collective focused on infrastructure-level disruption and exposing vulnerabilities in centralized digital networks. In March 2026, the group claimed responsibility for a large-scale DDoS attack against ArvanCloud, Iran's primary cloud and CDN provider, causing widespread service outages across platforms including the online education service Skyroom. The group announced the operation via Telegram, stating their goal was disruption of centralized infrastructure rather than data theft.

Storm-2949 is a sophisticated threat actor that exploited Microsoft’s Self-Service Password Reset process to compromise high-value accounts, primarily targeting IT personnel and senior leadership. They leveraged Azure tools and APIs to conduct reconnaissance, exfiltrate sensitive data from Microsoft 365 applications, and manipulate Azure resources, including Key Vaults and SQL databases. The actor employed social engineering tactics to bypass MFA and utilized custom Python scripts for directory discovery and data exfiltration. Their operations included lateral movement across cloud and endpoint environments while mimicking legitimate administrative behavior.

SnowSoul is a financially motivated threat actor active since at least early 2026, operating a low-ransom extortion scheme primarily targeting Chinese organizations. The actor sends extortion demands of around $2,000 USD, and when victims refuse to pay, leaks stolen data on hacker forums. Operations are tracked through numbered identifiers (e.g., SnowSoul ID-1265, ID-1270), suggesting a systematic, serial campaign.

SHADOW-WATER-063 is a financially motivated threat actor attributed to the Banana RAT banking trojan, primarily targeting Brazilian financial accounts. Analysis of recovered artifacts, including a Python panel and PowerShell stagers, supports a moderate-confidence attribution assessment. The actor's infrastructure and endpoint telemetry indicate a focus on executing fraudulent transactions. Key evidentiary pillars establish their intent to exploit Brazilian financial systems.

Narketing163 is a financially motivated threat actor named after one of their frequently used email addresses (narketing163@gmail.com). Active since at least July 2023, the actor conducts large-scale phishing campaigns distributing commodity infostealer and keylogger malware disguised as business correspondence such as price quotes, order forms, and payment notices. Targets span multiple countries including Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkey, the USA, Germany, the UK, India, and others, across sectors including e-commerce, retail, chemicals, construction, healthcare, insurance, and food. The actor delivers malware via spearphishing attachments (compressed archives) deploying RedLine Stealer, Agent Tesla, FormBook, and Snake Keylogger against Windows systems. Exfiltration is performed via actor-controlled Roundcube mail servers. Emails are sent in Russian, Azerbaijani, Turkish, and English, with rotating sender IPs and use of anonymization tools such as VPNs and proxies.

JINX-0164 is a financially motivated threat actor active since mid-2025, primarily targeting software developers through recruitment-themed social engineering to steal cryptocurrencies and conduct supply chain attacks. Their operations have focused on macOS devices, utilizing malware such as AUDIOFIX and MINIRAT, with a notable supply chain compromise involving the trojanization of an npm package. The actor employs a shell script for initial system profiling and payload delivery, often spoofing legitimate services like Microsoft Teams and cryptocurrency companies. JINX-0164's infrastructure includes numerous lookalike domains and utilizes VPN exit nodes for accessing victim systems.

Inteid is a member of the Russian Legion alliance, which includes groups like Cardinal and The White Pulse, and has been involved in DDoS attacks targeting Denmark's health portal, sundhed.dk. The group has also participated in ICS attacks, primarily affecting the Energy & Utilities, Manufacturing, and Agriculture sectors across Europe. Inteid has demonstrated operational coordination with other hacktivist entities, such as Keymous+, to support Iranian cyberwar efforts against Israeli targets.

GREYVIBE is a low-to-moderately sophisticated threat actor associated with Russian state interests, primarily targeting Ukrainian entities. The group employs custom malware like LegionRelay and PhantomRelay, utilizing techniques such as decoy-and-payload execution logic and systematic use of GenAI and LLMs throughout their operations. Their campaigns exhibit operational overlaps with other groups, including shared C2 infrastructure and post-compromise tooling. WithSecure has identified design flaws in their malware that have provided insights into their victimology and operational behavior.

GHOST STADIUM is a Chinese-speaking, financially motivated threat actor operating a sophisticated phishing campaign across over 300 domains, utilizing a custom React-based phishing kit that closely mimics FIFA's official website and exploits the PingIdentity SSO login flow. The campaign has the potential to generate financial losses estimated between $71 million and $474 million from premium ticket fraud alone, with total losses potentially reaching billions. GHOST STADIUM employs Facebook Ads as a primary traffic acquisition channel and has been linked to 2,513 compromised FIFA credentials available on dark-web markets. The actor is part of a broader fraud ecosystem that includes multiple parallel schemes, such as credential phishing and counterfeit merchandise sales.

DriveSurge compromises legitimate websites to inject scripts that route visitors through zTDS, leading them to fake browser updates and ClickFix-style prompts. This operation resembles an initial-access broker model, where successful infections generate leads for downstream threat actors. The actor employs tactics that avoid detection by site administrators, allowing infections to go unnoticed during routine checks.

CL-UNK-1068 is a Chinese threat actor that has targeted critical infrastructure in Asia, primarily focusing on cyberespionage. They utilize cross-platform tools, including the Xnote Linux backdoor and the GodZilla web shell, to maintain a persistent presence and execute credential theft. Their TTPs involve DLL side-loading, the use of custom malware, and batch scripts to bypass security measures. The group has demonstrated a capability for data exfiltration from SQL servers and has employed tools like DumpIt and Volatility for memory analysis.

CL-STA-1020 targets Southeast Asian government networks, employing AWS Lambda Function URLs configured with AuthType: NONE for stealthy command-and-control communication. The actor has been observed collecting sensitive information from governmental entities, including data on tariffs and trade disputes. An investigation revealed a new Windows backdoor named HazyBeacon, which utilizes this novel C2 technique. This activity cluster has demonstrated significant efforts to remain undetected while executing its operations.

Chronus Team is a hacktivist group known for defacement attacks and data leaks, primarily targeting public-sector organizations in Mexico. They have been linked to multiple cyber incidents, including a significant breach of the Sonora Ministry of Education and Culture, where they allegedly exfiltrated sensitive data on educators. Their operations involve traditional hacking methods and the distribution of stolen data through channels typical of cybercriminals. The group's activities raise concerns about identity theft, fraud, and the destabilization of public institutions due to the exposure of sensitive information.

Wizard Spider is reportedly associated with Grim Spider and Lunar Spider. The WIZARD SPIDER threat group is the Russia-based operator of the TrickBot banking malware. This group represents a growing criminal enterprise of which GRIM SPIDER appears to be a subset. The LUNAR SPIDER threat group is the Eastern European-based operator and developer of the commodity banking malware called BokBot (aka IcedID), which was first observed in April 2017. The BokBot malware provides LUNAR SPIDER affiliates with a variety of capabilities to enable credential theft and wire fraud, through the use of webinjects and a malware distribution function. GRIM SPIDER is a sophisticated eCrime group that has been operating the Ryuk ransomware since August 2018, targeting large organizations for a high-ransom return. This methodology, known as “big game hunting,” signals a shift in operations for WIZARD SPIDER, a criminal enterprise of which GRIM SPIDER appears to be a cell. The WIZARD SPIDER threat group, known as the Russia-based operator of the TrickBot banking malware, had focused primarily on wire fraud in the past.

WageMole is a North Korean state-sponsored APT that employs social engineering and technology to secure remote job opportunities in Western countries, leveraging stolen personal data from the Contagious Interview campaign. Threat actors create fake identities, including passports and driver's licenses, and prepare study guides for interviews, often utilizing generative AI for well-structured responses. They target small to mid-sized businesses and utilize job platforms like Upwork and Indeed, while employing automation scripts for account creation. WageMole's activities include sharing code within their group and requesting payments through platforms like PayPal to conceal their identity.

Reporting regarding activity related to the SolarWinds supply chain injection has grown quickly since initial disclosure on 13 December 2020. A significant amount of press reporting has focused on the identification of the actor(s) involved, victim organizations, possible campaign timeline, and potential impact. The US Government and cyber community have also provided detailed information on how the campaign was likely conducted and some of the malware used. MITRE’s ATT&CK team — with the assistance of contributors — has been mapping techniques used by the actor group, referred to as UNC2452/Dark Halo by FireEye and Volexity respectively, as well as SUNBURST and TEARDROP malware.

A 2014 Guardian article described Turla as: 'Dubbed the Turla hackers, initial intelligence had indicated western powers were key targets, but it was later determined embassies for Eastern Bloc nations were of more interest. Embassies in Belgium, Ukraine, China, Jordan, Greece, Kazakhstan, Armenia, Poland, and Germany were all attacked, though researchers from Kaspersky Lab and Symantec could not confirm which countries were the true targets. In one case from May 2012, the office of the prime minister of a former Soviet Union member country was infected, leading to 60 further computers being affected, Symantec researchers said. There were some other victims, including the ministry for health of a Western European country, the ministry for education of a Central American country, a state electricity provider in the Middle East and a medical organisation in the US, according to Symantec. It is believed the group was also responsible for a much - documented 2008 attack on the US Central Command. The attackers - who continue to operate - have ostensibly sought to carry out surveillance on targets and pilfer data, though their use of encryption across their networks has made it difficult to ascertain exactly what the hackers took.Kaspersky Lab, however, picked up a number of the attackers searches through their victims emails, which included terms such as Nato and EU energy dialogue Though attribution is difficult to substantiate, Russia has previously been suspected of carrying out the attacks and Symantecs Gavin O’ Gorman told the Guardian a number of the hackers appeared to be using Russian names and language in their notes for their malicious code. Cyrillic was also seen in use.'

This threat actor targets organizations in the satellite communications, telecommunications, geospatial-imaging, and defense sectors in the United States and Southeast Asia for espionage purposes.

TA505, the name given by Proofpoint, has been in the cybercrime business for at least four years. This is the group behind the infamous Dridex banking trojan and Locky ransomware, delivered through malicious email campaigns via Necurs botnet. Other malware associated with TA505 include Philadelphia and GlobeImposter ransomware families.

Storm-1567 is the threat actor behind the Ransomware-as-a-Service Akira. They attacked Swedish organizations in March 2023. This ransomware utilizes the ChaCha encryption algorithm, PowerShell, and Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI). Microsoft's Defender for Endpoint successfully blocked a large-scale hacking campaign carried out by Storm-1567, highlighting the effectiveness of their security solution.

Andariel is a threat actor that primarily targets South Korean corporations and institutions. They are believed to collaborate with or operate as a subsidiary organization of the Lazarus threat group. WHOIS utilizes spear phishing attacks, watering hole attacks, and supply chain attacks for initial access. They have been known to exploit vulnerabilities and use malware such as Infostealer and TigerRAT.

A group targeting UA state organizations using the GraphSteel and GrimPlant malware.

Likely Chinese state-sponsored threat activity group RedDelta targeting organizations within Europe and Southeast Asia using a customized variant of the PlugX backdoor. Since at least 2019, RedDelta has been consistently active within Southeast Asia, particularly in Myanmar and Vietnam, but has also routinely adapted its targeting in response to global geopolitical events. This is historically evident through the group’s targeting of the Vatican and other Catholic organizations in the lead-up to 2021 talks between Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Vatican officials, as well as throughout 2022 through the group’s shift towards increased targeting of European government and diplomatic entities following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. During the 3-month period from September through November 2022, RedDelta has regularly used an infection chain employing malicious shortcut (LNK) files, which trigger a dynamic-link library (DLL) search-order-hijacking execution chain to load consistently updated PlugX versions. Throughout this period, the group repeatedly employed decoy documents specific to government and migration policy within Europe. Of note, we identified a European government department focused on trade communicating with RedDelta command-and-control (C2) infrastructure in early August 2022. This activity commenced on the same day that a RedDelta PlugX sample using this C2 infrastructure and featuring an EU trade-themed decoy document surfaced on public malware repositories. We also identified additional probable victim entities within Myanmar and Vietnam regularly communicating with RedDelta C2 infrastructure. RedDelta closely overlaps with public industry reporting under the aliases BRONZE PRESIDENT, Mustang Panda, TA416, Red Lich, and HoneyMyte.

This threat actor targets nongovernmental organizations using Mongolian-themed lures for espionage purposes. In April 2017, CrowdStrike Falcon Intelligence observed a previously unattributed actor group with a Chinese nexus targeting a U.S.-based think tank. Further analysis revealed a wider campaign with unique tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). This adversary targets non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in general, but uses Mongolian language decoys and themes, suggesting this actor has a specific focus on gathering intelligence on Mongolia. These campaigns involve the use of shared malware like Poison Ivy or PlugX. Recently, Falcon Intelligence observed new activity from MUSTANG PANDA, using a unique infection chain to target likely Mongolia-based victims. This newly observed activity uses a series of redirections and fileless, malicious implementations of legitimate tools to gain access to the targeted systems. Additionally, MUSTANG PANDA actors reused previously-observed legitimate domains to host files.

Lotus Blossom is a threat group that has targeted government and military organizations in Southeast Asia.

INDRIK SPIDER is a sophisticated eCrime group that has been operating Dridex since June 2014. In 2015 and 2016, Dridex was one of the most prolific eCrime banking trojans on the market and, since 2014, those efforts are thought to have netted INDRIK SPIDER millions of dollars in criminal profits. Throughout its years of operation, Dridex has received multiple updates with new modules developed and new anti-analysis features added to the malware. In August 2017, a new ransomware variant identified as BitPaymer was reported to have ransomed the U.K.’s National Health Service (NHS), with a high ransom demand of 53 BTC (approximately $200,000 USD). The targeting of an organization rather than individuals, and the high ransom demands, made BitPaymer stand out from other contemporary ransomware at the time. Though the encryption and ransom functionality of BitPaymer was not technically sophisticated, the malware contained multiple anti-analysis features that overlapped with Dridex. Later technical analysis of BitPaymer indicated that it had been developed by INDRIK SPIDER, suggesting the group had expanded its criminal operation to include ransomware as a monetization strategy.

GOLD PRELUDE is a financially motivated cybercriminal threat group that operates the SocGholish (aka FAKEUPDATES) malware distribution network. GOLD PRELUDE operates a large global network of compromised websites, frequently running vulnerable content management systems (CMS), that redirect into a malicious traffic distribution system (TDS). The TDS, which researchers at Avast have named Parrot TDS, uses opaque criteria to select victims to serve a fake browser update page. These pages, which are customized to the specific visiting browser software, download the JavaScript-based SocGholish payload frequently embedded within a compressed archive.

From November 2017 to October 2018, we attributed 14 campaigns to the GC threat actors that used a specific MaaS provider (hereinafter “the Provider”) offered by a known individual (hereinafter “the Provider Operator”).

Unit 42 threat researchers have recently observed a threat group distributing new, custom developed malware. We have labelled this threat group the Gamaredon Group and our research shows that the Gamaredon Group has been active since at least 2013. In the past, the Gamaredon Group has relied heavily on off-the-shelf tools. Our new research shows the Gamaredon Group have made a shift to custom-developed malware. We believe this shift indicates the Gamaredon Group have improved their technical capabilities.

Activity: defense and aerospace sectors, also interested in targeting entities in the oil/gas industry.

Charming Kitten (aka Parastoo, aka Newscaster) is an group with a suspected nexus to Iran that targets organizations involved in government, defense technology, military, and diplomacy sectors.

BRONZE HIGHLAND has been observed using spearphishing as an initial infection vector to deploy the MgBot remote access trojan against targets in Hong Kong. Third party reporting suggests the threat group also targets India, Malaysia and Taiwan and leverages Cobalt Strike and KsRemote Android Rat. CTU researchers assess with moderate confidence that BRONZE HIGHLAND operates on behalf of China and has a remit covering espionage against domestic human rights and pro-democracy advocates and nations neighbouring China

We have observed one APT group, which we call APT5, particularly focused on telecommunications and technology companies. More than half of the organizations we have observed being targeted or breached by APT5 operate in these sectors. Several times, APT5 has targeted organizations and personnel based in Southeast Asia. APT5 has been active since at least 2007. It appears to be a large threat group that consists of several subgroups, often with distinct tactics and infrastructure. APT5 has targeted or breached organizations across multiple industries, but its focus appears to be on telecommunications and technology companies, especially information about satellite communications. APT5 targeted the network of an electronics firm that sells products for both industrial and military applications. The group subsequently stole communications related to the firm’s business relationship with a national military, including inventories and memoranda about specific products they provided. In one case in late 2014, APT5 breached the network of an international telecommunications company. The group used malware with keylogging capabilities to monitor the computer of an executive who manages the company’s relationships with other telecommunications companies

FireEye has identified APT35 operations dating back to 2014. APT35, also known as the Newscaster Team, is a threat group sponsored by the Iranian government that conducts long term, resource-intensive operations to collect strategic intelligence. APT35 typically targets U.S. and the Middle Eastern military, diplomatic and government personnel, organizations in the media, energy and defense industrial base (DIB), and engineering, business services and telecommunications sectors.

A 2015 report by F-Secure describe APT29 as: 'The Dukes are a well-resourced, highly dedicated and organized cyberespionage group that we believe has been working for the Russian Federation since at least 2008 to collect intelligence in support of foreign and security policy decision-making. The Dukes show unusual confidence in their ability to continue successfully compromising their targets, as well as in their ability to operate with impunity. The Dukes primarily target Western governments and related organizations, such as government ministries and agencies, political think tanks, and governmental subcontractors. Their targets have also included the governments of members of the Commonwealth of Independent States;Asian, African, and Middle Eastern governments;organizations associated with Chechen extremism;and Russian speakers engaged in the illicit trade of controlled substances and drugs. The Dukes are known to employ a vast arsenal of malware toolsets, which we identify as MiniDuke, CosmicDuke, OnionDuke, CozyDuke, CloudDuke, SeaDuke, HammerDuke, PinchDuke, and GeminiDuke. In recent years, the Dukes have engaged in apparently biannual large - scale spear - phishing campaigns against hundreds or even thousands of recipients associated with governmental institutions and affiliated organizations. These campaigns utilize a smash - and - grab approach involving a fast but noisy breakin followed by the rapid collection and exfiltration of as much data as possible.If the compromised target is discovered to be of value, the Dukes will quickly switch the toolset used and move to using stealthier tactics focused on persistent compromise and long - term intelligence gathering. This threat actor targets government ministries and agencies in the West, Central Asia, East Africa, and the Middle East; Chechen extremist groups; Russian organized crime; and think tanks. It is suspected to be behind the 2015 compromise of unclassified networks at the White House, Department of State, Pentagon, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The threat actor includes all of the Dukes tool sets, including MiniDuke, CosmicDuke, OnionDuke, CozyDuke, SeaDuke, CloudDuke (aka MiniDionis), and HammerDuke (aka Hammertoss). '

This threat actor uses phishing techniques to compromise the networks of foreign ministries of European countries for espionage purposes.