Threat Intelligence Directory

This threat actor targets the South Korean government, transportation, and energy sectors.

OldGremlin is a Russian-speaking ransomware group that has been active for several years. They primarily target organizations in Russia, including banks, logistics, industrial, insurance, retail, and IT companies. OldGremlin is known for using phishing emails as an initial infection vector and has developed custom malware for both Windows and Linux systems. They have conducted multiple malicious email campaigns and demand large ransoms from their victims, with some reaching millions of dollars.

OilAlpha has almost exclusively relied on infrastructure associated with the Public Telecommunication Corporation (PTC), a Yemeni government-owned enterprise reported to be under the direct control of the Houthi authorities. OilAlpha used encrypted chat messengers like WhatsApp to launch social engineering attacks against its targets. It has also used URL link shorteners. Per victimology assessment, it appears a majority of the targeted entities were Arabic-language speakers and operated Android devices.

NoName057(16) is performing DDoS attacks on websites belonging to governments, news agencies, armies, suppliers, telecommunications companies, transportation authorities, financial institutions, and more in Ukraine and neighboring countries supporting Ukraine, like Ukraine itself, Estonia, Lithuania, Norway, and Poland.

In the first quarter of 2018, CrowdStrike Intelligence identified NOMAD PANDA activity targeting Central Asian nations with exploit documents built with the 8.t tool.

Mentioned as MaaS operator in CrowdStrike's 2020 Report.

[Night Dragon](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0014) is a campaign name for activity involving a threat group that has conducted activity originating primarily in China. (Citation: McAfee Night Dragon)

NightEagle is an advanced Threat Actor that targeted China's High-Tech Industry and Military Organisation, leveraging sophisticated techniques, 0 days, and specialized detection avoiding malware. The threat actor seems to have access to significant funding, with dedicated infrastructure, and focuses on low-noise, low-impact intelligence gathering operations. NightEagle is identified as a North-American, state-sponsored or affiliated group that has been active since at least 2023.

Nexus Zeta is no stranger when it comes to implementing SOAP related exploits. The threat actor has already been observed in implementing two other known SOAP related exploits, CVE-2014–8361 and CVE-2017–17215 in his Satori botnet project. A third SOAP exploit, TR-069 bug has also been observed previously in IoT botnets. This makes EDB 38722 the fourth SOAP related exploit which is discovered in the wild by IoT botnets.

NewsPenguin is threat actor that has been targeting organizations in Pakistan. They use a complex payload delivery mechanism and exploit the upcoming Pakistan International Maritime Expo & Conference as a lure to trick their victims. The group has been linked to a phishing campaign that leverages spear-phishing emails and weaponized documents to deliver an advanced espionage tool.

NetRunnerPR has claimed to breach the networks of Shiraume Hospital and Nippon Medical School Musashi Kosugi Hospital in Japan, exfiltrating patient PII and medical records. The actor announced plans to release a complete database on March 5, 2026, and an additional 20,000 records on February 16, 2026, contingent on undisclosed conditions. The claims were made on a cybercrime forum, accompanied by sample data to validate the breaches. NetRunnerPR's account shows limited activity history and lacks a documented history of major ransomware operations or confirmed breaches, raising questions about the credibility of the claims.

[NEODYMIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0055) is an activity group that conducted a campaign in May 2016 and has heavily targeted Turkish victims. The group has demonstrated similarity to another activity group called [PROMETHIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0056) due to overlapping victim and campaign characteristics. (Citation: Microsoft NEODYMIUM Dec 2016) (Citation: Microsoft SIR Vol 21) [NEODYMIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0055) is reportedly associated closely with [BlackOasis](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0063) operations, but evidence that the group names are aliases has not been identified. (Citation: CyberScoop BlackOasis Oct 2017)

Network Battalion 65 is an hactivist group with ties to Anonymous, known for attacking Russian companies and performing hack-and-leak operations.

This actor was identified by Juan Andres Guerrero-Saade from the SIG37 cluster as published in the ShadowBrokers' 'Lost in Translation' leak. Earliest known sighting potentially dates back to as far as 2008 with a confirmed center of activity around 2010-2013. The actor name is derived from a PDB debug string fragment: 'khzer'. Victimology indicates targeting of Iran, assessed with low confidence based on VT file submission locations. Nazar employs a modular toolkit where a main dropper silently registers multiple DLLs as OLE controls in the Windows registry. Functionality includes keylogging, sound and screen grabbing, as well as traffic capture using the MicroOlap Packet Sniffer library.

Natohub is a hacker who claimed to have stolen 42,000 documents from the UN’s International Civil Aviation Organization and is offering the data for sale on underground forums. The compromised documents allegedly contain personal records of ICAO staff and others associated with the agency. While ICAO is investigating the potential breach, Natohub has also made unverified claims about accessing personal data on thousands of UN delegates. The actor's track record of leaks is limited, raising questions about the credibility of their assertions.

NARWHAL SPIDER’s operation of Cutwail v2 was limited to country-specific spam campaigns, although late in 2019 there appeared to be an effort to expand by bringing in INDRIK SPIDER as a customer.

Nam3L3ss is a threat actor who has leaked data from 25 companies, including over 2.8 million lines of Amazon employee data, which was confirmed to be stolen from a third-party service provider. The actor is distributing this data on BreachForums and claims to have numerous unreleased datasets.

In March 2022, a hacking group calling themselves N4ughtySecTU claimed to have breached TransUnion’s systems and threatened to leak four terabytes of data if the credit bureau didn’t pay a $15-million (R242-million) ransom.

[Mustard Tempest](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1020) is an initial access broker that has operated the [SocGholish](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1124) distribution network since at least 2017. [Mustard Tempest](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1020) has partnered with [Indrik Spider](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0119) to provide access for the download of additional malware including LockBit, [WastedLocker](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0612), and remote access tools.(Citation: Microsoft Ransomware as a Service)(Citation: Microsoft Threat Actor Naming July 2023)(Citation: Secureworks Gold Prelude Profile)(Citation: SocGholish-update)

MurenShark is an advanced persistent threat group that operates primarily in the Middle East, with a focus on targeting Turkey. They have shown interest in military projects, as well as research institutes and universities. This group is highly skilled in counter-analysis and reverse traceability, using sophisticated tactics to avoid detection. They utilize compromised websites as file servers and command and control servers, and have been known to use attack tools like NiceRender for phishing purposes.

MUMMY SPIDER is a criminal entity linked to the core development of the malware most commonly known as Emotet or Geodo. First observed in mid-2014, this malware shared code with the Bugat (aka Feodo) banking Trojan. However, MUMMY SPIDER swiftly developed the malware’s capabilities to include an RSA key exchange for command and control (C2) communication and a modular architecture. MUMMY SPIDER does not follow typical criminal behavioral patterns. In particular, MUMMY SPIDER usually conducts attacks for a few months before ceasing operations for a period of between three and 12 months, before returning with a new variant or version. After a 10 month hiatus, MUMMY SPIDER returned Emotet to operation in December 2016 but the latest variant is not deploying a banking Trojan module with web injects, it is currently acting as a ‘loader’ delivering other malware packages. The primary modules perform reconnaissance on victim machines, drop freeware tools for credential collection from web browsers and mail clients and a spam plugin for self-propagation. The malware is also issuing commands to download and execute other malware families such as the banking Trojans Dridex and Qakbot. MUMMY SPIDER advertised Emotet on underground forums until 2015, at which time it became private. Therefore, it is highly likely that Emotet is operate

[MuddyWater](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069) is a cyber espionage group assessed to be a subordinate element within Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).(Citation: CYBERCOM Iranian Intel Cyber January 2022) Since at least 2017, [MuddyWater](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069) has targeted a range of government and private organizations across sectors, including telecommunications, local government, finance, defense, and oil and natural gas organizations, in the Middle East (specifically the UAE and Saudi Arabia), Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America. [MuddyWater](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069) has reused domains dating back to October 2025, and has a preference for NameCheap and Hosterdaddy Private Limited (AS136557). In late 2025 and early 2026, [MuddyWater](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0069) used commercial satellite internet (i.e., Starlink) for command and control (C2) communication. (Citation: FalconFeeds_Iran_Mar2026)(Citation: Huntio_IranInfra_Mar2026)(Citation: Unit 42 MuddyWater Nov 2017)(Citation: Symantec MuddyWater Dec 2018)(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater Nov 2018)(Citation: ClearSky MuddyWater June 2019)(Citation: Reaqta MuddyWater November 2017)(Citation: DHS CISA AA22-055A MuddyWater February 2022)(Citation: Talos MuddyWater Jan 2022)(Citation: NaumaanProofpoint_GlobalClickFix_April2025)(Citation: ESET_MuddyWater_Dec2025)(Citation: SymantecCarbonBlack_Seedworm_Mar2026)

[MoustachedBouncer](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1019) is a cyberespionage group that has been active since at least 2014 targeting foreign embassies in Belarus.(Citation: MoustachedBouncer ESET August 2023)

Threat actor tracked by Malpedia.

Moshen Dragon is a Chinese-aligned cyberespionage threat actor operating in Central Asia. They have been observed deploying multiple malware triads and utilizing DLL search order hijacking to sideload ShadowPad and PlugX variants. The threat actor also employs various tools, including an LSA notification package and a passive backdoor known as GUNTERS. Their activities involve targeting the telecommunication sector and leveraging Impacket for lateral movement and data exfiltration.

MORH4x is a self-proclaimed Moroccan hacking group that claimed responsibility for a data leak from Algeria's pharmaceutical industry ministry. The group announced the breach on the BreachForums website, stating that the leaked files span from 2019 to 2025 and include internal documents related to Algeria's pharmaceutical imports. This incident is part of a series of escalating cyberattacks between Moroccan and Algerian hacking groups.

Mora_001 is a threat actor exhibiting a distinct operational signature that combines opportunistic attacks with ties to the LockBit ecosystem. The actor has been observed exploiting CVE-2024-55591 and CVE-2025-24472 vulnerabilities affecting Fortinet devices. The ransom note associated with Mora_001 includes the same TOX ID used by LockBit, indicating a potential affiliation or shared communication channels. Their post-exploitation patterns suggest a structured playbook that differentiates them from other ransomware operators, including LockBit affiliates.

Spambots continued to decline in 2019, with MONTY SPIDER’s CraP2P spambot falling silent in April.

In less than two years, this group has conducted over 20 successful attacks on financial institutions and legal firms in the USA, UK and Russia. The group has primarily been targeting card processing systems, including the AWS CBR (Russian Interbank System) and purportedly SWIFT (US). Given the wide usage of STAR in LATAM, financial institutions in LATAM could have particular exposure to a potential interest from the MoneyTaker group.

[Molerats](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0021) is an Arabic-speaking, politically-motivated threat group that has been operating since 2012. The group's victims have primarily been in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States.(Citation: DustySky)(Citation: DustySky2)(Citation: Kaspersky MoleRATs April 2019)(Citation: Cybereason Molerats Dec 2020)

Molatori is a threat actor group identified by Malwarebytes researchers, known for utilizing malicious ScreenConnect clients hosted on domains like atmolatori.icu and gomolatori.cyou. They employ phishing tactics, masquerading as communications from the Social Security Administration to lure targets into installing the client. Once installed, the ScreenConnect client allows the actors to remotely access the victim's computer, facilitating the exfiltration of sensitive information such as banking details and personal identification numbers. The primary objective of the Molatori group is financial fraud, leveraging the stolen data for identity theft and other malicious activities.

[Mofang](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0103) is a likely China-based cyber espionage group, named for its frequent practice of imitating a victim's infrastructure. This adversary has been observed since at least May 2012 conducting focused attacks against government and critical infrastructure in Myanmar, as well as several other countries and sectors including military, automobile, and weapons industries.(Citation: FOX-IT May 2016 Mofang)

Our research into these intrusions revealed a decade of persistent malicious activity targeting specific groups and individuals that we now attribute to a previously unknown threat actor named ModifiedElephant. This actor has operated for years, evading research attention and detection due to their limited scope of operations, the mundane nature of their tools, and their regionally-specific targeting. ModifiedElephant is still active at the time of writing.

Mocha Manakin is a threat actor that employs the paste and run technique for initial access, tricking users into executing scripts that download various payloads, including LummaC2, HijackLoader, and Vidar. This actor is notable for utilizing a bespoke NodeJS-based backdoor named NodeInitRAT, which facilitates persistence and reconnaissance activities while communicating with adversary-controlled servers over HTTP. Mocha Manakin has been linked to Interlock ransomware, and while direct ransomware activity has not been observed, there is moderate confidence that unmitigated activity may lead to such outcomes. The effectiveness of paste and run lures, distributed through methods like phishing and web browser injects, has contributed to the actor's increased scope and scale.

[MirrorFace](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1054) is a People's Republic of China (PRC)-aligned cyberespionage actor believed to be a subgroup under the [menuPass](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0045) umbrella based on targeting, tools, and infrastructure overlaps. [MirrorFace](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1054) has been active since at least 2019, at first exclusively targeting Japanese organizations across the media, defense, diplomatic, financial, manufacturing, and academic sectors. Subsequent [MirrorFace](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1054) operations included targets in Central Europe and featured use of [LODEINFO](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9020), [HiddenFace](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9023), and [UPPERCUT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0275) malware.(Citation: Kaspersky LODEINFO OCT 2022)(Citation: Kaspersky LODEINFO Part II OCT 2022)(Citation: ESET MirrorFace DEC 2022)(Citation: JPCERT MirrorFace JUL 2024)(Citation: Trend Micro Earth Kasha NOV 2024)(Citation: Trend Micro Earth Kasha Updates APR 2025)

Threat actor tracked by Malpedia.

MIMIC SPIDER is mentioned in two summary reports only

[Metador](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1013) is a suspected cyber espionage group that was first reported in September 2022. [Metador](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1013) has targeted a limited number of telecommunication companies, internet service providers, and universities in the Middle East and Africa. Security researchers named the group [Metador](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1013) based on the "I am meta" string in one of the group's malware samples and the expectation of Spanish-language responses from C2 servers.(Citation: SentinelLabs Metador Sept 2022)

Massgrave is a hacking group that has developed a method to bypass Microsoft's software licensing for Windows and Office, enabling permanent activation of versions from Windows Vista to Windows 11. They are known for creating effective scripts for software activation, which are distributed through an unofficial repository at massgrave.dev. The group claims their exploit supports volume activation via the Key Management Services model and has gained traction within the piracy scene. Reports indicate that their tools may be used by unauthorized individuals, including Microsoft support agents, raising legal and security concerns.

Markopolo is a threat actor known for running scams targeting cryptocurrency users through a fake app called Vortax. They use social media and a dedicated blog to legitimize their malicious activities. Markopolo has been linked to a credential-harvesting operation and is agile in pivoting to new scams when detected. The actor leverages shared hosting and C2 infrastructure for their malicious builds.