Threat Intelligence Directory

Agonizing Serpens is an Iranian-linked APT group that has been active since 2020. They are known for their destructive wiper and fake-ransomware attacks, primarily targeting Israeli organizations in the education and technology sectors. The group has strong connections to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security and has been observed using various tools and techniques to bypass security measures. They aim to steal sensitive information, including PII and intellectual property, and inflict damage by wiping endpoints.

First observed in January 2018, GandCrab ransomware quickly began to proliferate and receive regular updates from its developer, PINCHY SPIDER, which over the course of the year established a RaaS operation with a dedicated set of affiliates. CrowdStrike Intelligence has recently observed PINCHY SPIDER affiliates deploying GandCrab ransomware in enterprise environments, using lateral movement techniques and tooling commonly associated with nation-state adversary groups and penetration testing teams. This change in tactics makes PINCHY SPIDER and its affiliates the latest eCrime adversaries to join the growing trend of targeted, low-volume/high-return ransomware deployments known as “big game hunting.” PINCHY SPIDER is the criminal group behind the development of the ransomware most commonly known as GandCrab, which has been active since January 2018. PINCHY SPIDER sells access to use GandCrab ransomware under a partnership program with a limited number of accounts. The program is operated with a 60-40 split in profits (60 percent to the customer), as is common among eCrime actors, but PINCHY SPIDER is also willing to negotiate up to a 70-30 split for “sophisticated” customers.

Prying Libra, also known as Pickaxe, is a threat actor active since at least August 2017, and continues to remain active to this day. The adversary's goal is to install and maintain a popular cryptocurrency miner on the victim's machine. The miner in question is an open-source tool named XMRig that generates the Monero cryptocurrency. Malware is delivered via downloads through the popular Adfly advertisement platform. Users are often mislead into clicking on a malicious advertisement that results in the payload being delivered to the victim. Once installed, the malware leverages VBS scripts and redirection services, such as bitly, to ultimately download and execute XMRig. Over 15 million confirmed victims have been discovered to be infected in recent campaigns, with actual numbers likely to be between 30-45 million victims. The victims are found across the globe, with high concentrations in Thailand, Vietnam, Egypt, Indonesia, and Turkey.

Phlox Tempest is a threat actor responsible for a large-scale click fraud campaign targeting users through YouTube comments and malicious ads. They use ChromeLoader to infect victims' computers with malware, often delivered as ISO image files that victims are tricked into downloading. The attackers aim to profit from clicks generated by malicious browser extensions or node-WebKit installed on the victim's device. Microsoft and other cybersecurity organizations have issued warnings about this ongoing and prevalent campaign.

PhantomControl is a sophisticated threat actor that emerged in November 2023. They utilize phishing emails as their initial infection vector and employ a ScreenConnect client to establish a connection for their malicious activities. Their arsenal includes a VBS script that hides its true intentions and reveals a complex mechanism involving PowerShell scripts and image-based data retrieval. PhantomControl has been associated with the Blind Eagle threat actors, showcasing their versatility and reach.

PerSwaysion is a threat actor known for conducting phishing campaigns targeting high-level executives. They have been active since at least August 2019 and are believed to be based in Vietnam. PerSwaysion has recently updated their techniques, using more direct phishing methods and leveraging Microsoft 365 to steal credentials.

Threat actor tracked by Malpedia.

Pearl Sleet is a nation state activity group based in North Korea that has been active since at least 2012. They primarily target defectors from North Korea, media organizations in carrying out their cyber espionage activities.

PayTool is a threat actor that operates a phishing ecosystem focused on traffic violation and fine payment scams targeting Canadians through SMS-based social engineering. Their campaigns impersonate Canadian government traffic enforcement services, utilizing a federal-style "Traffic Ticket Search Portal" model that aggregates provincial fine payment portals. PayTool maintains a pool of generic domains to ensure continuity when specific provincial domains are blacklisted, exploiting brand trust with disposable domains. Recommendations include implementing DNS and web gateway controls to block newly registered domains and known PayTool-related IP ranges.

Threat actor tracked by Malpedia.

The PassCV group continues to be one of the most successful and active threat groups that leverage a wide array of stolen Authenticode-signing certificates. Snorre Fagerland of Blue Coat Systems first coined the term PassCV in a blog post. His post provides a good introduction to the group and covers some of the older infrastructure, stolen code-signing certificate reuse, and other connections associated with the PassCV malware. There are several clues alluding to the possibility that multiple groups may be utilizing the same stolen signing certificates, but at this time SPEAR believes the current attacks are more likely being perpetrated by a single group employing multiple publicly available Remote Administration Tools (RATs). The PassCV group has been operating with continued success and has already started to expand their malware repertoire into different off-the-shelf RATs and custom code. SPEAR identified eighteen previously undisclosed stolen Authenticode certificates. These certificates were originally issued to companies and individuals scattered across China, Taiwan, Korea, Europe, the United States and Russia. In this post we expand the usage of the term ‘PassCV’ to encompass the malware mentioned in the Blue Coat Systems report, as well as the APT group behind the larger C2 infrastructure and stolen Authenticode certificates. We’d like to share some of our findings as they pertain to the stolen certificates, command and control infrastructure, and some of the newer custom RATs they’ve begun development on.

One actor that has emerged in this trend of human-operated attacks is an active, highly adaptive group that frequently drops Wadhrama as payload. PARINACOTA impacts three to four organizations every week and appears quite resourceful: during the 18 months that we have been monitoring it, we have observed the group change tactics to match its needs and use compromised machines for various purposes, including cryptocurrency mining, sending spam emails, or proxying for other attacks. The group’s goals and payloads have shifted over time, influenced by the type of compromised infrastructure, but in recent months, they have mostly deployed the Wadhrama ransomware. The group most often employs a smash-and-grab method, whereby they attempt to infiltrate a machine in a network and proceed with subsequent ransom in less than an hour. There are outlier campaigns in which they attempt reconnaissance and lateral movement, typically when they land on a machine and network that allows them to quickly and easily move throughout the environment. PARINACOTA’s attacks typically brute forces their way into servers that have Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) exposed to the internet, with the goal of moving laterally inside a network or performing further brute-force activities against targets outside the network. This allows the group to expand compromised infrastructure under their control. Frequently, the group targets built-in local administrator accounts or a list of common account names. In other instances, the group targets Active Directory (AD) accounts that they compromised or have prior knowledge of, such as service accounts of known vendors. The group adopted the RDP brute force technique that the older ransomware called Samas (also known as SamSam) infamously used. Other malware families like GandCrab, MegaCortext, LockerGoga, Hermes, and RobbinHood have also used this method in targeted ransomware attacks. PARINACOTA, however, has also been observed to adapt to any path of least resistance they can utilize. For instance, they sometimes discover unpatched systems and use disclosed vulnerabilities to gain initial access or elevate privileges.

Threat actor tracked by Malpedia.

A threat group that has been active for at least seven years has used malware, phishing and disinformation tactics to target activists, journalists, politicians and public figures in various Latin American countries. The threat actor, dubbed Packrat based on its preference for remote access Trojans (RATs) and because it has used the same infrastructure for several years, has been analyzed by Citizen Lab researchers John Scott-Railton, Morgan Marquis-Boire, and Claudio Guarnieri, and Cyphort researcher Marion Marschalek, best known for her extensive analysis of state-sponsored threats.

Antd is a miner found in the wild on September 18, 2018. Recently we discovered that the authors from Antd are actively delivering newer campaigns deploying a broad number of components, most of them completely undetected and operating within compromised third party Linux servers. Furthermore, we have observed that some of the techniques implemented by this group are unconventional, and there is an element of sophistication to them. We believe the authors behind this malware are from Chinese origin. We have labeled the undetected Linux.Antd variants, Linux.GreedyAntd and classified the threat actor as Pacha Group.

OVERLORD SPIDER, aka The Dark Overlord. Similar to ransomware operators today, OVERLORD SPIDER likely purchased RDP access to compromised servers on underground forums in order to exfiltrate data from corporate networks. The actor was known to attempt to “sell back” the data to the respective victims, threatening to sell the data to interested parties should the victim refuse to pay. There was at least one identified instance of OVERLORD SPIDER successfully selling victim data on an underground market.

OverFlame is a hacktivist group known for executing DDoS attacks and website defacements, primarily targeting government institutions and corporations in Europe and North America. The group has been involved in coordinated attacks alongside other pro-Russian threat actors, such as NoName057and the People’s Cyber Army, often motivated by anti-government and anti-corporate sentiments. OverFlame operates through underground forums and encrypted messaging platforms to coordinate attacks and recruit members. Their activities have included targeting financial services, political parties, and educational institutions, demonstrating a focus on disrupting critical infrastructure.

On May 7, 2019, Mayor Bernard “Jack” Young confirmed that the network for the U.S. City of Baltimore (CoB) was infected with ransomware, which was announced via Twitter1. This infection was later confirmed to be conducted by OUTLAW SPIDER, which is the actor behind the RobbinHood ransomware. The actor demanded to be paid 3 BTC (approximately $17,600 USD at the time) per infected system, or 13 BTC (approximately $76,500 USD at the time) for all infected systems to recover the city’s files.

OurMine is known for celebrity internet accounts, often causing cyber vandalism, to advertise their commercial services. (Trend Micro) In light of the recent report detailing its willingness to pay US$250,000 in exchange for the 1.5 terabytes’ worth of data swiped by hackers from its servers, HBO finds itself dealing with yet another security breach. Known for hijacking prominent social media accounts, the self-styled white hat hacking group OurMine took over a number of verified Twitter and Facebook accounts belonging to the cable network. These include accounts for HBO shows, such as “Game of Thrones,” “Girls,” and “Ballers.” This is not the first time that OurMine has claimed responsibility for hacking high- profile social networking accounts. Last year, the group victimized Marvel, The New York Times, and even the heads of some of the biggest technology companies in the world. Mark Zuckerberg, Jack Dorsey, Sundar Pichai, and Daniel Ek — the CEOs of Facebook, Twitter, Google and Spotify, respectively — have also fallen victim to the hackers, dispelling the notion that a career in software and technology exempts one from being compromised.

[Orangeworm](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0071) is a group that has targeted organizations in the healthcare sector in the United States, Europe, and Asia since at least 2015, likely for the purpose of corporate espionage.(Citation: Symantec Orangeworm April 2018) Reverse engineering of [Kwampirs](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0236), directly associated with [Orangeworm](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0071) activity, indicates significant functional and development overlaps with [Shamoon](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0140).(Citation: Cylera Kwampirs 2022)

[Operation Wocao](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0116) described activities carried out by a China-based cyber espionage adversary. [Operation Wocao](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0116) targeted entities within the government, managed service providers, energy, health care, and technology sectors across several countries, including China, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. [Operation Wocao](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0116) used similar TTPs and tools to APT20, suggesting a possible overlap.(Citation: FoxIT Wocao December 2019)

We are calling these attacks Operation WizardOpium. So far, we have been unable to establish a definitive link with any known threat actors. There are certain very weak code similarities with Lazarus attacks, although these could very well be a false flag. The profile of the targeted website is more in line with earlier DarkHotel attacks that have recently deployed similar false flag attacks.

Operation Triangulation is an ongoing APT campaign targeting iOS devices with zero-click iMessage exploits. The threat actor behind the campaign has been active since at least 2019 and continues to operate. The attack chain involves the delivery of a malicious iMessage attachment that launches a series of exploits, ultimately leading to the deployment of the TriangleDB implant. Kaspersky researchers have discovered and reported multiple vulnerabilities used in the campaign, with patches released by Apple.

In 2018, the Cybereason Nocturnus team identified an advanced, persistent attack targeting global telecommunications providers carried out by a threat actor using tools and techniques commonly associated with Chinese-affiliated threat actors, such as APT10. This multi-wave attacks focused on obtaining data of specific, high-value targets and resulted in a complete takeover of the network.

The McAfee Advanced Threat Research team and McAfee Labs Malware Operations Group have discovered a new global campaign targeting nuclear, defense, energy, and financial companies, based on McAfee® Global Threat Intelligence. This campaign, Operation Sharpshooter, leverages an in-memory implant to download and retrieve a second-stage implant—which we call Rising Sun—for further exploitation. According to our analysis, the Rising Sun implant uses source code from the Lazarus Group’s 2015 backdoor Trojan Duuzer in a new framework to infiltrate these key industries. Operation Sharpshooter’s numerous technical links to the Lazarus Group seem too obvious to immediately draw the conclusion that they are responsible for the attacks, and instead indicate a potential for false flags. Our research focuses on how this actor operates, the global impact, and how to detect the attack. We shall leave attribution to the broader security community.

Operation Shadow Force is a group of malware that is representative of Shadow Force and Wgdrop from 2013 to 2020, and is a group activity that attacks Korean companies and organizations. The group's first confirmed attack was in March 2013, but considering the date of malware creation, it is likely to have been active before 2012. Since the malware used mainly by them is Shadow Force, it was named Operation Shadow Force, and it has not been confirmed whether the attacker is associated with a known group.

Newly discovered supply chain attack that leveraged ASUS Live Update software. The goal of the attack was to surgically target an unknown pool of users, which were identified by their network adapters’ MAC addresses. To achieve this, the attackers had hardcoded a list of MAC addresses in the trojanized samples and this list was used to identify the actual intended targets of this massive operation. We were able to extract more than 600 unique MAC addresses from over 200 samples used in this attack. Of course, there might be other samples out there with different MAC addresses in their list.

The threat actors compromised the update server of a remote support solutions provider to deliver a remote access tool called 9002 RAT to their targets of interest through the update process. They carried this out by first stealing the company’s certificate then using it to sign the malware. They also configured the update server to only deliver malicious files if the client is located in the range of IP addresses of their target organisations.

What’s noteworthy is that according to the introduction on the compromised website of the polyclinic (http://www.p2f.ru), the institution was established in 1965 and it was founded by the Presidential Administration of Russia. The multidisciplinary outpatient institution mainly serves the civil servants of the highest executive, legislative, judicial authorities of the Russian Federation, as well as famous figures of science and art. Since it is the first detection of this APT attack by 360 Security on a global scale, we code-named it as “Operation Poison Needles”, considering that the target was a medical institution. Currently, the attribution of the attacker is still under investigation. However, the special background of the polyclinic and the sensitiveness of the group it served both indicate the attack is highly targeted. Simultaneously, the attack occurred at a very sensitive timing of the Kerch Strait Incident, so it also aroused the assumption on the political attribution of the attack.

This threat actor uses spear-phishing techniques to target parliaments, government ministries, academics, and media organizations, primarily in the Middle East, for the purpose of espionage. Based on our findings, we believe the attackers represent a previously unknown geopolitically motivated threat actor. The campaign started in 2017, with the attackers doing just enough to achieve their goals. They most likely have access to additional tools when needed and appear to have access to an elaborate database of contacts in sensitive organizations and personnel worldwide, especially of vulnerable and non-trained staff. The victim systems range from personal desktop or laptop systems to large servers with domain controller roles or similar. The nature of the targeted ministries varied, including those responsible for telecommunications, health, energy, justice, finance and so on. Operation Parliament appears to be another symptom of escalating tensions in the Middle East region. The attackers have taken great care to stay under the radar, imitating another attack group in the region. They have been particularly careful to verify victim devices before proceeding with the infection, safeguarding their command and control servers. The targeting seems to have slowed down since the beginning of 2018, probably winding down when the desired data or access was obtained. The targeting of specific victims is unlike previously seen behavior in regional campaigns by Gaza Cybergang or Desert Falcons and points to an elaborate information-gathering exercise that was carried out before the attacks (physical and/or digital). With deception and false flags increasingly being employed by threat actors, attribution is a hard and complicated task that requires solid evidence, especially in complex regions such as the Middle East.

Threat actor tracked by Malpedia.

Operation Ghoul is a profit-driven threat actor that targeted over 130 organizations in 30 countries, primarily in the industrial and engineering sectors. They employed high-quality social engineering techniques, such as spear-phishing emails disguised as payment advice from a UAE bank, to distribute malware. The group's main motivation is financial gain through the sale of stolen intellectual property and business intelligence, as well as attacks on banking accounts. Their attacks were effective, particularly against companies that were unprepared to detect them.

Operation ForumTroll is a sophisticated cyber espionage campaign discovered by Kaspersky in mid-March 2025. The attack exploited a zero-day vulnerability in Google Chrome, identified as CVE-2025-2783, which allowed attackers to bypass the browser's security features. Victims were infected by clicking on personalized phishing links in emails, allegedly from the organizers of the "Primakov Readings" forum, targeting media outlets, educational institutions, and government organizations in Russia. The goal of the attack appears to be espionage, and the campaign is believed to be the work of a state-sponsored APT group. Google quickly released an update to fix the vulnerability after being notified by Kaspersky.

Operation Emmental, also known as the Retefe gang, is a threat actor group that has been active since at least 2012. They primarily target customers of banks in countries such as Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, and Japan. The group has developed sophisticated malware, including a Mac alternative called Dok, to bypass two-factor authentication and hijack network traffic. They have also been observed using phishing emails to spread their malware. The group is believed to be Russian-speaking and has continuously improved their malicious codes over the years.

Operation DRBControl is a cyberespionage campaign targeting gambling companies in Southeast Asia, first identified in 2019. The operation involves the use of HyperBro malware and SysUpdate variants, with evidence of customer database and source code exfiltration. The threat actor has employed domain spoofing for command and control and has shown a consistent interest in the gambling industry. Trend Micro's analysis linked multiple tools and malware families to this campaign, indicating a sophisticated and evolving threat landscape.

Operation Comando is a pure cybercrime campaign, possibly with Brazilian origin, with a concrete and persistent focus on the hospitality sector, which proves how a threat actor can be successful in pursuing its objectives while maintaining a cheap budget. The use of DDNS services, publicly available remote access tools, and having a minimum knowledge on software development (in this case VB.NET) has been enough for running a campaign lasting month, and potentially gathering credit card information and other possible data.

Threat actor tracked by Malpedia.

Group targeting Indian Army or related assets in India, as well as activists and civil society in Pakistan. Attribution to a Pakistani connection has been made by TrendMicro and others.

This threat actor targets critical infrastructure entities in the oil and gas sector, primarily in Ukraine. The threat actors deploy the BugDrop malware to remotely access the microphones in their targets' computers to eavesdrop on conversations.

Konni is a threat actor associated with APT37, a North Korean cyber crime group. They have been active since 2012 and are known for their cyber-espionage activities. Konni has targeted various sectors, including education, government, business organizations, and the cryptocurrency industry. They have exploited vulnerabilities such as CVE-2023-38831 and have used malware like KonniRAT to gain control of victim hosts and steal important information.