Threat Intelligence Directory

BOSON SPIDER is a cyber criminal group, which was first identified in 2015, recently and inexplicably went dark in the spring of 2016, appears to be a tightly knit group operating out of Eastern Europe. They have used a variety of distribution mechanisms such as the infamous (and now defunct) angler exploit kit, and obfuscated JavaScript to reduce the detection by antivirus solutions.

Boolka is a threat actor known for infecting websites with malicious JavaScript scripts for data exfiltration. They have been carrying out opportunistic SQL injection attacks since at least 2022. Boolka has developed a malware delivery platform based on the BeEF framework and has been distributing the BMANAGER trojan. Their activities demonstrate a progression from basic website infections to more sophisticated malware operations.

Bondnet is a threat actor that deploys backdoors and cryptocurrency miners. They use high-performance bots as C2 servers and configure reverse RDP environments on compromised systems. Bondnet has infected over 15,000 Windows server machines worldwide, primarily targeting Windows Server 2008 R2 systems. The botnet is used for mining cryptocurrencies like Monero, ByteCoin, RieCoin, and ZCash, potentially earning the operator thousands of dollars per day.

Bohrium is an Iranian threat actor that has been involved in spear-phishing operations targeting organizations in the US, Middle East, and India. They often create fake social media profiles, particularly posing as recruiters, to trick victims into running malware on their computers. Microsoft's Digital Crimes Unit has taken legal action and seized 41 domains used by Bohrium to disrupt their activities. The group has shown a particular interest in sectors such as technology, transportation, government, and education.

Blue Tsunami, also known as Black Cube, is a cyber mercenary group associated with the private intelligence firm Black Cube. They target individuals in various industries, including human rights, finance, and consulting. Blue Tsunami engages in social engineering and uses techniques such as honeypot profiles, fake jobs, and fake companies to gather human intelligence for their clients. LinkedIn and Microsoft recently took down numerous fake accounts and company pages linked to Blue Tsunami.

Blue Termite is a group of suspected Chinese origin active in Japan.

BlueHornet is an advanced persistent threat group targeting government organizations in China, North Korea, Iran, and Russia. They have compromised and leaked data from other APT groups like Kryptonite Panda and Lazarus Group. BlueHornet has been involved in campaigns such as Operation Renminbi, Operation Ruble, and Operation EUSec, focusing on exfiltrating region-specific data and selling it on the dark web. They have also been known to collaborate with different threat actors and have recently disclosed a zero-day exploit in NGINX 1.18.

Bluebottle, a cyber-crime group that specializes in targeted attacks against the financial sector, is continuing to mount attacks on banks in Francophone countries. The group makes extensive use of living off the land, dual-use tools, and commodity malware, with no custom malware deployed in this campaign.

Threat actor tracked by Malpedia.

BladedFeline is an Iran-aligned APT group that has been active since at least 2017, targeting Iraqi and Kurdish government officials for cyberespionage. The group employs a variety of tools, including the Shahmaran backdoor, Whisper, and PrimeCache, which is a malicious IIS module. BladedFeline utilizes techniques such as spearphishing (T1566), exploiting public-facing applications (T1190), and timestomping to maintain access and exfiltrate data. The group is assessed with medium confidence to be a subgroup of OilRig, focusing on strategic access to high-ranking officials in the region.

Blackwood is a China-aligned APT group that has been active since at least 2018. They primarily engage in cyberespionage operations targeting individuals and companies in China, Japan, and the United Kingdom. Blackwood utilizes sophisticated techniques such as adversary-in-the-middle attacks to deliver their custom implant, NSPX30, through updates of legitimate software. They also have the capability to hide the location of their command and control servers by intercepting traffic generated by the implant.

[BlackTech](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0098) is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that has primarily targeted organizations in East Asia--particularly Taiwan, Japan, and Hong Kong--and the US since at least 2013. [BlackTech](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0098) has used a combination of custom malware, dual-use tools, and living off the land tactics to compromise media, construction, engineering, electronics, and financial company networks.(Citation: TrendMicro BlackTech June 2017)(Citation: Symantec Palmerworm Sep 2020)(Citation: Reuters Taiwan BlackTech August 2020)

Blacktail is a cybercrime group that has gained attention for its ransomware campaigns, particularly the Buhti ransomware. They are known for using custom-built data exfiltration tools and have been observed exploiting vulnerabilities in both Windows and Linux systems.

[BlackOasis](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0063) is a Middle Eastern threat group that is believed to be a customer of Gamma Group. The group has shown interest in prominent figures in the United Nations, as well as opposition bloggers, activists, regional news correspondents, and think tanks. (Citation: Securelist BlackOasis Oct 2017) (Citation: Securelist APT Trends Q2 2017) A group known by Microsoft as [NEODYMIUM](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0055) is reportedly associated closely with [BlackOasis](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0063) operations, but evidence that the group names are aliases has not been identified. (Citation: CyberScoop BlackOasis Oct 2017)

BLACKMETA is a pro-Palestinian hacktivist group that has claimed responsibility for a series of DDoS attacks and data breaches targeting organizations perceived as supportive of Israel, including the Internet Archive and various entities in the UAE and Saudi Arabia. The group employs DDoS attacks, website defacement, and data exfiltration, with motivations rooted in political ideology and retribution for perceived injustices against Palestinians. Their operations have been linked to a Telegram channel, where they publicize their activities and collaborate with other hacktivist groups. Additionally, they have been attributed to significant cyber disruptions, including a 100-hour DDoS campaign against a UAE bank, showcasing their operational capabilities.

Blackjack, a threat actor linked to Ukraine's security apparatus, has targeted critical Russian entities such as ISPs, utilities, and military infrastructure. They have claimed responsibility for launching cyberattacks resulting in substantial damage and data exfiltration. The group allegedly used the Fuxnet malware to target sensor gateways connected to internet-connected sensors, impacting infrastructure monitoring systems. Blackjack has also been involved in attacks against companies like Moscollector, causing disruptions and stealing sensitive data.

BLACKGEAR is an espionage campaign which has targeted users in Taiwan for many years. Multiple papers and talks have been released covering this campaign, which used the ELIRKS backdoor when it was first discovered in 2012. It is known for using blogs and microblogging services to hide the location of its actual command-and-control (C&C) servers. This allows an attacker to change the C&C server used quickly by changing the information in these posts. Like most campaigns, BLACKGEAR has evolved over time. Our research indicates that it has started targeting Japanese users. Two things led us to this conclusion: first, the fake documents that are used as part of its infection routines are now in Japanese. Secondly, it is now using blogging sites and microblogging services based in Japan for its C&C activity.

Recent campaigns suggest Hamas-linked actors may be advancing their TTPs to include intricate social engineering lures specially crafted to appeal to a niche group of high value targets. In September 2023, a Palestine-based group likely linked to Hamas targeted Israeli software engineers using an elaborate social engineering ruse that ultimately installed malware and stole cookies. The attackers, which Google’s Threat Analysis Group (TAG) tracks as BLACKATOM, posed as employees of legitimate companies and reached out via LinkedIn to invite targets to apply for software development freelance opportunities. Targets included software engineers in the Israeli military, as well as Israel’s aerospace and defense industry

BITWISE SPIDER has recently and quickly become a significant player in the big game hunting (BGH) landscape. Their dedicated leak site (DLS) has received the highest number of victims posted each month since July 2021 compared to other adversary DLSs due to the growing popularity and effectiveness of LockBit 2.0.

Threat actor tracked by Malpedia.

Bignosa is a threat actor known for launching malware campaigns targeting Australian and US organizations using phishing emails with disguised Agent Tesla attachments protected by Cassandra Protector. They compromised servers by installing Plesk and RoundCube, connected via SSH and RDP, and used advanced obfuscation methods to evade detection. Bignosa collaborated with another cybercriminal named Gods, who provided advice and assistance in their malicious activities. The actor has been linked to multiple phishing attacks and malware distribution campaigns, showcasing a high level of sophistication in their operations.

A pro-Hamas hacktivist group developed a wiper called BiBi-Linux to target and destroy data on Israeli systems. The malware impersonates ransomware but operates solely to corrupt and delete files, indicating no data theft. A Windows variant, BiBi-Windows, was also discovered, sharing similarities with BiBi-Linux but targeting all files except executables. ESET researchers have named the group behind the wipers BiBiGun. The group's TTPs have shown overlaps with Moses Staff, which is believed to have an Iran nexus.

aka Belesn Group

Mentioned as operator of TriumphLoader and Matanbuchus

Threat actor tracked by Malpedia.

BazarCall campaigns forgo malicious links or attachments in email messages in favor of phone numbers that recipients are misled into calling. It’s a technique reminiscent of vishing and tech support scams where potential victims are being cold called by the attacker, except in BazarCall’s case, targeted users must dial the number. And when they do, the users are connected with actual humans on the other end of the line, who then provide step-by-step instructions for installing malware into their devices.

BatShadow is a Vietnamese threat actor that targets job seekers and digital marketing professionals through social engineering campaigns, deploying the Go-based malware known as Vampire Bot. The group impersonates recruiters and distributes malicious job descriptions and corporate PDFs, triggering a multi-stage infection chain that enables remote surveillance and data theft. Analysts have linked BatShadow to Vietnam based on infrastructure reuse and targeting patterns, noting its history of using domains like samsung-work.com to distribute various malware families, including Agent Tesla and Quasar RAT. The actor employs techniques such as filename tricks and coercive browser actions to evade detection and increase the likelihood of successful compromises.

BANISHED KITTEN is an Iranian state-nexus adversary active since at least 2008. While the adversary’s most prominent activity is the July and September 2022 disruptive attacks targeting Albanian government infrastructure and the use of the HomelandJustice persona to leak stolen data, BANISHED KITTEN has likely targeted dissidents using the AllinOneNeo malware family.

Crowdstrike tracks the developer of Panda Zeus as BAMBOO SPIDER

Kaspersky researchers have identified a new APT group named BadRory that has mounted two waves of spear-phishing attacks against Russian organizations. The campaigns took place in October 2022 and April 2023 and leveraged boobytrapped Office emails. Targets included government entities, military contractors, universities, and hospitals.

[BackdoorDiplomacy](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0135) is a cyber espionage threat group that has been active since at least 2017. [BackdoorDiplomacy](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0135) has targeted Ministries of Foreign Affairs and telecommunication companies in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.(Citation: ESET BackdoorDiplomacy Jun 2021)

We are AzzaSec — a decentralized PMC (Private Military Contractor), RaaS (Ransomware-as-a-Service) syndicate, and botnet operator at the intersection of cyberwarfare, asymmetric operations, and underground economics. <br/> <br/>Emerging from the collapse of traditional hacktivism, we evolved into a sovereign digital force. We offer custom offensive solutions to clients with political, financial, or strategic objectives. We are stateless, leaderless, and loyal only to code. <br/>

Ayyıldız (Crescent and Star) Tim is a nationalist hacking group founded in 2002. It performs defacements and DDoS attacks against the websites of governments that it considers to be repressing Muslim minorities or engaged in Islamophobic policies.

Awaken Likho is an APT group that has targeted Russian government agencies and industrial enterprises, employing techniques such as information gathering via search engines and using MeshCentral for remote access. The group has been active since at least December 2021 and has ramped up its activities following the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. Recent reports indicate that they are focusing on espionage against critical infrastructure in the defense and energy sectors. Analysis of their malware reveals a new version that is still in development, suggesting ongoing operational capabilities.

The group’s existence came to light during Context’s investigation of a number of attacks against multinational enterprises that compromise smaller engineering services and consultancies working in their supply chains.

NSFOCUS Security Labs recently discovered a new attack process based on phishing documents in their daily threat-hunting operations. Delving deeper into this finding through extensive research, they confirmed two new Trojan horse programs and many rare attack techniques and tactics. NSFOCUS Security Labs believes that this new attack process comes from a new APT attacker, who has a high technical level and cautious attack attitude. The phishing attack activity captured this time is part of the attacker’s targeted strike on specific targets and is its main means to achieve in-domain penetration. NSFOCUS Security Labs validated the high-level threat attributes of AtlasCross in terms of development technology and attack strategy through an in-depth analysis of its attack metrics. At this current stage, AtlasCross has a relatively limited scope of activity, primarily focusing on targeted attacks against specific hosts within a network domain. However, the attack processes they employ are highly robust and mature. NSFOCUS Security Labs deduce that this attacker is highly likely to deploy this attack process into larger-scale network attack operations.

Asnarök is a threat actor that exploited CVE-2020-12271 and utilized command injection privilege escalation to gain root access to devices and install the Asnarök Trojan and demonstrated significant changes in TTPs, including the deployment of a web shell that did not reach out to external C2 for commands. X-Ops identified a patient-zero device linked to the attack and observed the use of an IC.sh script that stole local user account data. The actor's activities were linked to a broader pattern of malicious exploit research and targeted vulnerabilities disclosed by bug bounty researchers.

Turkish nationalist hacktivist group that has been active for roughly one year. According to Domaintools, the group’s site has been registered since December 2015, with an active Twitter account since January 2016. The group carries out distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks and defacements against the sites of news organizations and governments perceived to be critical of Turkey’s policies or leadership, and purports to act in defense of Islam

AridViper is a state-sponsored APT primarily targeting military personnel, journalists, and dissidents in the Middle East, with a focus on Israel and Palestine. The group employs custom-developed mobile malware, including variants like AridSpy, GnatSpy, and Micropsia, often delivered through spear-phishing emails and deceptive applications. Their operations involve sophisticated social engineering tactics, including the use of fake social media profiles and weaponized apps masquerading as legitimate services. AridViper's activities are characterized by a blend of technical sophistication and psychological manipulation, aiming to exfiltrate sensitive data from compromised systems.

ArcaneDoor is a campaign that is the latest example of state-sponsored actors targeting perimeter network devices from multiple vendors. Coveted by these actors, perimeter network devices are the perfect intrusion point for espionage-focused campaigns. As a critical path for data into and out of the network, these devices need to be routinely and promptly patched; using up-to-date hardware and software versions and configurations; and be closely monitored from a security perspective. Gaining a foothold on these devices allows an actor to directly pivot into an organization, reroute or modify traffic and monitor network communications. In the past two years, we have seen a dramatic and sustained increase in the targeting of these devices in areas such as telecommunications providers and energy sector organizations — critical infrastructure entities that are likely strategic targets of interest for many foreign governments.